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I n t r o d u c t i o n
Three recent and sometimes conflicting trends have contributed to re­
newed public concern and debate over health-related religious practices. 
First, more and more people are acknowledging and even insisting on a pa­
tient’s right to make his or her own health- and death-related choices. Sec­
ond, there has been an increasing (though reluctant) acknowledgment by 
the medical community of the effectiveness of alternative approaches to 
healing, including religious approaches, for at least some types of people 
with some types of diseases. And third, the state has becomc increasingly 
involved in “protecting” vulnerable populations such as children, the el­
derly, and the disabled.
Because of increased recognition of a patient’s right to refuse conven­
tional medical treatments and to seek alternative healing methods, it is now 
widely accepted by medical ethicists and the courts that competent adults 
may refuse life-saving treatments on religious grounds. But can parents 
refuse medical treatment for their children? Although neither a legal nor 
an ethical consensus has been reached on this question, there has been in­
creased public concern over (as well as state interference in) a wide variety 
of types of cases of apparent child neglect and abuse. Whether medical re­
fusals for children are tantamount to child abuse has not yet been legally 
determined. In fact, in various cases across the country in which children 
have died as a result of their parents’ exclusive reliance on a religious cure, 
the chargcs against such parents have ranged from no charges at all to ne­
glect to child endangerment to manslaughter to murder.
This volume focuses the debate over the ethics surrounding conflicting 
religious and medical practices by examining the specific case of health-re­
lated choices made by and for Christian Scientists. Although there are sev­
eral religious groups who refuse medical treatment or components of it, the
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issues surrounding Christian Scientists’ medical refusals are especially vexing 
and ethically complex. Many of us are vaguely familiar with the fact that 
“Christian Scientists are the ones who do not go to doctors,” but few know 
much more about how a Christian Scientist’s view of the world conflicts with 
that of the majority; nor do many of us know much about the substantive 
ethical issues surrounding a Christian Scientist’s health-related choices.
There are several reasons for delving more deeply into the political, so­
cial, and ethical conflicts that arise from the practice of Christian Science. 
First, medical professionals in clinical settings are likely to encounter a va­
riety of diverging cultures and worldviews that incorporate approaches to 
health and healing that clash with medical approaches. The culture and 
worldview of Christian Scientists is a good case in point. Second, our soci­
ety must decide how tolerant it should be toward minority groups, reli­
gious or otherwise, with defining practices that challenge the moral con­
victions of the majority. Christian Science children’s cases do tend, at least 
prima facie, to challenge one of our deepest moral convictions that chil­
dren should not be allowed to suffer or die. And third, because Christian 
Scientists tend to be well-educated professionals who generally make ra­
tional, well-informed choices in their lives, their health-related choices can­
not simply be dismissed as choices made by irrational fanatics. Rather, a de­
termination of the rationality of their choices can only be made after an 
in-depth critical examination of their views and practices.
This volume addresses the issues surrounding the health-related choices 
of Christian Scientists in a rather unique way. It has a point-counterpoint for­
mat but contains three voices rather than the usual two. The three authors 
of this book are philosophers who work in overlapping areas of philosophy 
but take very different stands. Peggy DesAutels has published in the areas of 
medical ethics, moral psychology, and philosophy of mind. Peggy Battin has 
published in bioethics, aesthetics, health policy, professional ethics, and in 
particular on end-of-life issues. Larry May has published in philosophy of 
law, theory of moral responsibility, and professional ethics. Battin and May 
are not Christian Scientists; DesAutels was raised in this tradition.
High-Risk Religions and Informed Consent
In the first half of the book, Peggy DesAutels and Margaret P. Battin ex­
amine certain religious practices by drawing on concepts and norms from 
professional ethics, rational choice theory, and philosophy of science. The 
religious practices of concern to them involve the ways in which some re­
ligious institutions influence their members to make “high-risk” decisions.
More specifically, they address the following questions: Why do members 
of the Christian Science church uniformly take health-related risks that 
other people do not? And is the Christian Science church ethically irre­
sponsible in the ways it influences its members’ decision-making processes?
DesAutels and Battin differ over whether the Christian Science Church 
is ethically remiss for failing to supply healing success-rate statistics to its 
adherents. Battin claims that the Christian Science Church is morally cul­
pable for publishing only anecdotal accounts of healing successes because 
its members are then unable to assess the risks involved in choosing a Chris­
tian Science approach to healing. She argues that the Christian Science 
Church systematically disregards the principle of autonomy and violates re­
quirements of informed consent by providing to its adherents only selected 
accounts of successful cures. DesAutels, on the other hand, defends the 
practice of publishing only healing successes. She argues that the Christian 
Scientist’s decision to pursue spiritual means for treatment does not re­
semble in structure the decision to pursue a particular medical treatment 
and that therefore cure-rate information is inapplicable to a Christian Sci­
entist’s decision-making process.
Christian Science in a Pluralistic Society
In the second half of the book, Peggy DesAutels and Larry May debate 
how to treat the seemingly harmful practices of a minority religion within 
a larger pluralistic, secular society. May considers the stalemate that can 
arise between Christian Scientists and medical professionals over the treat­
ment of Christian Science children to be primarily a conflict of groups over 
authority within a pluralistic society. He takes a communitarian perspec­
tive on the question: In a pluralistic society such as ours, at what point 
should respect for a religious minority culture be tempered by concerns for 
the fundamental rights of children? May argues that neither the medical 
community nor the Christian Science community should be given exclu­
sive purview in determining the best means for securing a child’s right to 
health. Rather, the two groups should compromise. Christian Scientists 
should be socialized to be more open to medical diagnoses in order better 
to know when to seek medical help for their children in life-threatening sit­
uations, and medical professionals should be socialized to be more sensi­
tive to patients as persons and more open to nonstandard approaches to 
health in non-life-threatening situations.
DesAutels responds by claiming that the conflicts that arise between 
Christian Scientists and medical professionals are best described not as a
Introduction 3
conflict over authority but as a conflict over worldviews. She maintains that 
the fundamental disagreement between members of the two groups rests on 
the significant disparities between a religious idealist belief system and a sec­
ular materialist belief system. No compromise is possible between two such 
different worldviews. Because neither group intends that children suffer and 
both groups value the health of children, the two groups should simply re­
spect each other’s disparate worldviews and resulting health-related choices.
Practices, Beliefs, and Church Structure 
of Christian Scientists
Christian Scientists rarely, if ever, go to doctors. They usually choose in­
stead to rely exclusively on prayer for healing. One major difference be­
tween a Christian Scientist’s approach to praying for healing and that taken 
by more mainstream Christian denominations is that Christian Scientists 
do not attempt to “mix” prayer with a medical approach. They view the 
two approaches—prayer versus medicine—as incompatible. Christian Sci­
ence doctrine does not forbid going to doctors. Rather, it is up to each 
Christian Scientist to decide whether to use a Christian Science prayer- 
based approach or a medical approach.
Because Christian Scientists choose to take such a radical stand on 
health-related issues and because they commit to a lifestyle so different 
from most, their choice to be Christian Scientists is usually a carefully con­
sidered one. They do not deem themselves to be Christian Scientists sim­
ply by virtue of their choice of church on Sunday. Even those whose up­
bringing included faithful attendance at a Christian Science church must 
eventually choose for themselves whether to make the significant commit­
ment to a way of life that includes, among other things, daily prayer and 
study, no drinking, and no smoking.
The Christian Science view of prayer is different from that of some 
“faith-healing” religions. For Christian Scientists, it is an ongoing process 
of better understanding and demonstrating that there is a perfect spiritual 
order already in existence. They believe that when this order is felt and un­
derstood, suffering in human experience is overcome and eliminated. Thus 
prayer is not viewed as a petition to God to intervene by performing a mir­
acle of some sort. Rather, prayer is a search for an increased understanding 
of spiritual reality—a search that, when successful, results in the exemplifi­
cation of this reality in one’s experience. When praying about a specific sit­
uation, Christian Scientists mentally affirm relevant spiritual facts and deny 
the ultimate reality of anything that appears to contradict these facts.
4 Introduction
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In philosophical terms, Christian Scientists are idealists. Mary Baker 
Eddy, the woman who founded Christian Science in the 1860s, reasoned 
that if God, infinite Mind, is All, then there is no matter. What is perceived 
by humans as a physical universe is, in reality, nothing more than the con­
scious and unconscious thoughts of mortals. As Richard Nenneman, a 
Christian Scientist and past editor of the Christian Science Monitor, ex­
plains it, the physical universe is “ultimately unreal, but it is, in terms of the 
human perception of it, also plastic—it is molded according to the think­
ing brought to bear on it by each individual.”1 In other words, for Chris­
tian Scientists, the experience of inharmonious physical conditions (e.g., 
disease) is illusory and temporary. Their view is that a better understand­
ing of God’s harmonious spiritual universe will cause an apparently un­
healthy physical condition to change into a healthy, harmonious “physical” 
condition. Prayer, then, is not just an optimistic hope “in the patient’s 
mind” but is, for Christian Scientists, a better grasp of the loving and good 
nature of ultimate reality. This better understanding is exemplified on the 
patient’s body, since for a Christian Scientist, the patient’s body is itself 
nothing more than an image in thought.
Christian Scientists refer to themselves as “Christian” because they 
study and attempt to follow the teachings and example of Jesus. But their 
conception of Jesus’ relation to God differs from that of most other Chris­
tian denominations. The human Jesus is, for Christian Scientists, an ex­
emplar and way show-er, but Jesus’ relationship to God is seen as being 
no different from any other human’s. Jesus merely expressed and demon­
strated God’s ever-presence more fully than any other human being has 
before or since. Thus, Christian Scientists think that anyone can heal just 
as Jesus did by emulating his way of life and better understanding his 
teachings.
The structure of the Christian Science Church also differs from that of 
many mainstream Christian denominations. There are no Christian Sci­
ence ministers or clergy. Instead, church services are conducted by two 
“readers” who are elected from within each church’s congregation to 
serve for two or three years. Sunday services incorporate readings from the 
Bible and the Christian Science “textbook,” Science and Health with Key 
to the Scriptures, by Mary Baker Eddy.2 Wednesday evening services also 
include time for members of the congregation to share recent healing ex­
periences or thoughts on Christian Science. Rules for governing both the 
central or “Mother” church, in Boston, Massachusetts, and its branch 
churches throughout the United States and the world, are found in the 
Church Manual}
When Christian Scientists desire assistance or guidance from other 
Christian Scientists, they have several options. If they would like someone 
to pray for them, they can call on a Christian Science “practitioner.” Prac­
titioners charge for their services and are listed in the Christian Science 
Journal, a monthly publication. They are well versed in the teachings of 
Christian Science and are required to submit evidence of healing effec­
tiveness to the Mother Church prior to being listed. If Christian Scientists 
wish to learn more about how to practice the teachings of Christian Sci­
ence in their day-to-day lives, they can apply for what is termed “class in­
struction.” These two-week classes are taught by “teachers” of Christian 
Science. Practitioners who have been especially successful at prayer-based 
healing and have gone through an additional course from a current 
teacher of Christian Science are eligible themselves to become teachers. 
Trained Christian Science nurses are also available for those who need 
nursing services. Unlike practitioners and teachers, nurses do not pray for 
their patients and, unlike medical nurses, they do not administer any sort 
of medication. Instead, they assist with daily hygiene, dress wounds, and 
keep patients as comfortable as possible while the patient addresses the sit­
uation through prayer. Most major cities in the United States have several 
Christian Science churches (First Church of Christ, Scientist; Second 
Church of Christ Scientist; and so on). Many also have a Christian Science 
nursing facility.
As specific issues and controversies arise in the course of this volume’s 
debate, additional details on Christian Science views and practices are 
brought to bear. However, the authors of this volume do not pretend to 
offer a complete exposition of either Christian Science theology or the 
Christian Science way of life. Instead, they hope to expand a new field 
within applied philosophy—one in which the ethics surrounding the views, 
values, and practices found within an organized religion are reflectively and 
critically examined by both those within the religion and those who stand 
outside it.
Notes
1. Richard A. Nenneman, The New Birth o f Christianity: Why Religion Persists 
in a Scientific Age (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1992), 155-156.
2. Mary Baker Eddy, Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures (1875; 
Boston: The First Church o f Christ, Scientist, 1934).
3. Mary Baker Eddy, M anual of The Mother Church, The First Church o f Christ, 
Scientist in Boston, Massachusetts■ 89th ed. (Boston: The First Church of Christ, Sci­
entist, 1895).
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1H i g h - R i s k  R e l i g i o n :  
C h r i s t i a n  S c i e n c e  a n d  t h e  V i o l a t i o n  
o f  I n f o r m e d  C o n s e n t
Margaret P. Battin
In some of the more colorful groups on the American religious spectrum, 
the religious faith of believers involves a willingness to take substantial 
physical risks—risks to health and physical functioning, even the risk of 
death. In several of these groups, the risks a believer takes are indirect, as 
in refusing blood transfusions or other medical treatment; in others, the 
risks are direct and immediate, as in drinking strychnine or handling poi­
sonous snakes. Christian Science, as the Church of Christ, Scientist, is in­
formally called, is one of these groups: Its members refuse virtually all med­
ical treatment for illness or disease, relying instead on Christian Science’s 
distinctive practice of “healing.”
We may think of these practices as extraordinary tests of religious com­
mitment. A willingness to risk death seems to exhibit the extraordinary value 
religion can have for believers; indeed, willingness to risk death for religious 
reasons is often extolled as the highest test of faith. But this willingness also 
raises a set of disturbing moral issues concerning the ways in which religious 
groups encourage their adherents to take such risks.
In what follows, I want to take a closer look at the influence of religious 
groups on their adherents’ choices, focusing on high-risk decision mak­
ing that can result in death, particularly in Christian Science. The same 
sorts of issues arise for many other groups as well: Jehovah’s Witnesses; 
the Indiana-based Faith Assembly; the serpent-handling, strychnine- 
drinking Holiness churches of the Appalachian Mountains; the Okla­
homa-Colorado Church of the First Born; End Time Ministries in South
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Dakota; the Pennsylvania-based Faith Tabernacle; the Oregon City, Ore­
gon, group the Followers of Christ; and others.1 I do not wish to suggest 
that the willingness of believers in these groups to risk death may not be 
sincere and devout; rather, I want to cast a morally inquiring eye on the 
way in which religious institutions engender these sincere, devout beliefs. 
Christian Science, I shall argue, is among the most problematic of these.
This characterization may seem to be at odds with the social position of 
Christian Science. It is sometimes claimed in defense of Christian Science 
that its members tend to be upper-income, well-educated, professional 
people who are stable members of society, nonusers of drugs, alcohol, or 
tobacco—solid citizens, reliable and trustworthy. This is not a group on 
the margins of society or one scrabbled together by taking advantage of 
unfortunates with serious social or psychological problems. Yet, I shall ar­
gue, the practices of the Christian Science church nevertheless constitute a 
continuing violation of one of the most basic ordinary and professional 
moral norms, the requirement of informed consent when individuals are 
asked or invited to take risks to their own health or lives.
How do people come to take risks? How may other persons and institu­
tions influence someone to take risks he or she might otherwise not accept? 
Is there something distinctive (or troubling) about a religious group that 
encourages its members to take risks—risks with their health, risks with 
their lives? To pose the problem in a precise way, we can conceptualize the 
issue of high-risk religion as it might be addressed in the field of profes­
sional ethics. Drawing on issues concerning the formation and manipula­
tion of choice, especially in medicine, we can approach this problem under 
the general rubric of informed consent, thus applying norms from profes-
In everyday life, risks that a person voluntarily and knowingly takes can be 
described as the result of a prudential calculation, however rudimentary that 
calculation may be in practice, in which he or she elects a course of action 
hoping it will produce a gain or avoid a loss while recognizing that it may ei­
ther concurrendy or alternatively result in a (further) loss. This prudential 
calculation involves a survey of the range of possible outcomes of the action 
proposed, an assessment of the likelihood of the various possible outcomes 
(the decision is made under risk if the probabilities are known, under uncer­
tainty if they are not), and an assessment of the relative desirability or unde­
sirability of each of the possible outcomes. Typically, avoidance risk taking
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weighs two or more projected negative outcomes against each other; gain- 
oriented, positive risk taking may weigh various positive outcomes against 
each other, or a positive outcome against both the cost of failing to achieve 
it and the cost of failing to take the risk. Whatever the specific context of the 
risk decision, the decision maker properly makes the calculation by multi­
plying the value of each possible outcome times the probability that it will 
occur, if known (or the best approximation to it), and then choosing the 
course of action promising the highest expected utility. That this calculation 
may be made in a completely intuitive, nonquantitative way does not obscure 
its nature: Conscious decision making under risk or under uncertainty always 
involves acting so as to produce some preferred outcome while recognizing 
that this action may instead produce a different, undesired result.
Each individual, Charles Fried has pointed out, has a distinctive risk bud­
get—the degree and severity of risk he or she is willing to accept in order 
to avoid certain losses or to achieve certain gains.2 The risk budget is a 
function of the possible courses of action the individual foresees, the prob­
abilities he or she assigns to the various possible outcomes, and the utili­
ties he or she attaches to each of these, influenced by any characteristic 
errors the person may make in performing the prudential calculation that 
indicates what course of action promises the greatest expected utility. Al­
though the risk budgets of ordinary individuals in a culture appear to be 
fairly uniform with respect to the background risks of everyday life (e.g., in 
drinking the water in a given locality or in using electricity in one’s home), 
there is considerable divergence in the willingness of individuals to accept 
specific higher foreground risks—for instance, in financial dealings or in 
high-risk sports like hang gliding or mountain climbing. This is just to say 
that some members of a culture take risks that other members of the cul­
ture won’t.
Furthermore, each individual has a distinctive risk style—the degree of 
deliberation or abandon he or she exercises in making a prudential calcu­
lation under risk or uncertainty. Some people assess perceived risks with 
meticulous, painstaking care, regardless of whether the risks are mild or se­
vere and the amount of information they have about the probabilities of 
various possible outcomes; other take both big and little risks in a com­
paratively cavalier way. Different individuals also process relevant informa­
tion in very different ways. For instance, some are naturally optimistic, 
focusing primarily on the benefits to be gained; other are comparatively 
pessimistic, attending to possible losses, even when their estimates of the 
probabilities of the outcomes are the same. In processing information, 
some individuals may be more prone to characteristic errors of reasoning
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in risk assessment than others. Like risk budgets, the risk styles of persons 
within a culture are relatively uniform with respect to background risks but 
may vary considerably among individuals with respect to certain more con­
spicuous risks. Some people make their choices about risks in ways that 
other people would regard as foolish.
The problem presented by the practices of Christian Science, as well as 
other high-risk religious groups, arises with an observation about risk bud­
gets and styles. The members of a culture ordinarily exhibit broad com­
monalities in both risk budgets and styles with respect to background risks; 
they also typically exhibit a range of idiosyncratic, individual risk budgets 
and styles with respcct to certain conspicuous, higher-risk decisions. How­
ever, the risk budgets and styles of the members of certain religious groups 
display striking uniformities not so much with respect to background risks 
but with respect to major, conspicuous foreground risks—direct risks to 
health, physical functions, and even risks to life. Furthermore, the kinds of 
risk characteristically taken by members of these groups often fall well out­
side the risk budgets and, in addition, violate the risk styles of most other 
members of society, even outside the quite broad range of individual varia­
tion in risk budget and style that members of the culture ordinarily display 
in their decisions. Put another way, the members of certain religious groups 
like Christian Science take risks other people do not and decide to do so in 
ways that other people would not, but they nevertheless do so in remark­
ably uniform ways. Nor are these trivial risks; some are potentially fatal ones.
These characteristic risk-taking patterns, each distinctive of a particular 
group, may seem to be just another element in the colorful spectrum of 
American religious diversity. But this diversity cloaks substantial moral 
issues about the ways in which religious groups influence and shape indi­
vidual decision making among their members. It is not merely that these 
people take risks other people do not and decide to do so in ways other 
people would not; it is the very uniformity of these group-specific risk bud­
gets and styles and the degree to which they fall outside the ordinary range 
of variation that invites scrutiny of the mechanisms by which they are pro­
duced. What we will find in these religious groups—including Christian 
Science—are systematic, doctrine-controlled violations of the principle of 
autonomy, that is, of the moral principle familiar in professional and ordi­
nary ethics that requires both protection of an individual’s capacity to 
choose and respect for the substance of that choice.
If there are violations of the principle of autonomy, they can be identified 
by locating the precise point at which they occur in the paradigmatic 
decision-making process, evident in varying forms in different religious
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groups whose adherents regularly make choices that indirectly or direcdy 
expose them to risks of death. Are these choices informed ? Do they involve 
consent> genuine consent that is voluntary and uncoercedr In answering these 
questions (questions that can be articulated more clearly in part because we 
are approaching the problem from the standpoint of professional ethics), we 
will come to see that at least some of the ways in which religious groups 
shape and control high-risk decision making are morally indefensible.
Risk Taking in Christian Science
The First Church of Christ, Scientist, takes the refusal of conventional med­
ical treatment in favor of Christian Science healing as central among its prac­
tices and as indicative of faith.3 According to Christian Science belief, what 
we (mistakenly) call “disease” is produced by a “radically limited and dis­
torted view of the true spiritual nature and capacities of men and women.”4 
“Illness” results from “human alienation from God,”5 produced by funda­
mental misunderstanding. Disease is symptomatic not of physical disorder 
but of underlying spiritual inadequacy and a failure to understand one’s true 
spiritual nature. A faithful member of the church who falls ill consults a 
Christian Science practitioner to seek treatment, which consists “entirely of 
heartfelt yet disciplined prayer.”6 The practitioner, who is often consulted by 
telephone (sometimes long distance) and need not make a bedside visit, has 
no medical training in either diagnosis or treatment. The practitioner docs 
not physically touch or examine the patient. Rather, the practitioner assists 
the ill person in prayer, the objective of which is to relieve physical symptoms 
by promoting the correct and reverent understanding of the true nature of 
disease: In reality there is no such thing. Prayer is believed to be incompati­
ble with conventional medical treatment, since a medical treatment presup­
poses the misleading assumption that there is such a thing as disease, that it 
is of physical origin, and that it can be treated by physical means. Properly, 
one cannot speak of cure> for there is no disease to be cured; rather, the re­
lief of symptoms is a “demonstration” of the correctness of the principles 
upon which Christian Science is founded. Christian Scientists do generally 
use the services of dentists and oculists and sometimes have physicians per­
form what they call “mechanical” procedures not involving medication, such 
as setting broken bones; but other than this, no conventional medical pro­
cedures, either diagnostic or therapeutic, arc used.7 For services rendered in 
praying for and with the individual who is ill, the Christian Science practi­
tioner receives a fee roughly comparable to the fees conventional physicians 
charge. This fee is reimbursable by many insurance companies (including
some Blue Cross/Blue Shield plans) and by some state and federal Medicare 
and Medicaid programs.8 There are about 2,800 Christian Science practi­
tioners who practice healing through prayer on a full-time basis and about 
675 nurses listed in the Christian Science Journal.9
Frequently, the choice between Christian Science healing and conven­
tional medical treatment does not constitute a subjectively recognized risk 
for the devout Scientist, since belief in the efficacy of Christian Science 
healing may be very strong. In such cases, the individual may be confident 
that Christian Science healing will provide relief from the condition that 
troubles him. Nevertheless, the choice to accept treatment from a Chris­
tian Science practitioner rather than a medical doctor, or not to accept 
treatment at all, resembles in structure any other prudential calculation un­
der risk: Various possible outcomes—cure, continuing illness, incapacita­
tion, and death—are foreseen under specific valuations and under more or 
less quantifiable expectations about the likelihood of their occurrence. 
Christian Scientists are, of course, aware of the availability of conventional 
medicine; medical treatment is a possible choice, but one that, on pruden­
tial grounds, the believing Christian Scientist does not make. The believ­
ing Scientist not only thinks he or she is acting in accord with the dictates 
or expectations of the faith but also that he or she will maximize the like­
lihood of achieving the outcome with the greatest expected utility, namely, 
a successful cure, by preferring Christian Science healing to conventional 
medicine. It is in this choice that the risk taking lies; the believing Chris­
tian Scientist, of course, sees it as a good risk.
Christian Science is not the only religious group whose high-risk prac­
tices challenge the principle of informed consent. Others include Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, who refuse a single component of medical treatment—the 
transfusion of blood or blood derivatives into their bodies—on the basis of 
scriptural passages that prohibit eating or drinking blood; the Faith As­
sembly, a small fundamentalist group centered in northwestern Indiana, 
which at its height prohibited members from consulting doctors or using 
any medical treatment at all, including vaccination, assistance in childbirth, 
emergency treatment, prostheses, eyeglasses, or hearing aids; and the H o­
liness churches, widespread in the Appalachian regions of the southeastern 
United States, many of which practice serpent handling and strychnine 
drinking on the basis of biblical directives, and others named at the outset: 
the Church of the First Born, End Time Ministries, the Faith Tabernacle, 
and the Followers of Christ, all of which teach avoidance of medical care. 
But Christian Science is the one I want to focus on here, in part because 
its practices are particularly problematic.
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Altering Risk Budgets
Even when the risk taker’s prudential calculation is neither skewed by the 
imposition of coercively large costs for failing to take the risk nor made in 
an emotionally heightened condition, there are two further ways this cal­
culation can be distorted. Like any other group, a religious group can in­
fluence the individual’s estimate of the probability of the various outcomes 
he or she foresees, or it can change the evaluations assigned by the indi­
vidual to these outcomes, or both. In both cases, the effect of the influence 
is not to coerce choice or to impair its quality by altering risk style but to 
alter the individual’s risk budget.
Altering Assessments of Probabilities
A person reasonably conversant with the circumstances of the world knows 
certain facts: that malnourishment impairs health, that rattlesnakes are poi­
sonous, that acute appendicitis can be fatal, and so on. These common­
places are as familiar to the religious person as to the nonreligious; they are 
part of the common stock of background information shared within a cul­
ture. Hence, the religious risk taker, at least when the risks are understood 
to be common, physical ones, will have a fair amount of background 
knowledge about the risks he or she takes. A snake handler knows that rat­
tlesnake bites can be fatal; that is what makes snake handling important and 
why it serves as a test of faith.10 Similarly, Faith Assembly members know 
that hemorrhage in childbirth can be fatal; that is why it is a test of com­
mitment to the church’s beliefs to refuse treatment and why, in the con­
troversial case of Sally Burkitt (a Faith Assembly member who bled to death 
during the delivery of her baby), assisted only by prayer and not by a mid­
wife or physician, Sally pleaded for a doctor instead. Of course, in many 
cases religious risk takers will not know the precise degree of risk involved 
(as most of us do not know the precise risk from hemorrhage in childbirth 
or from untreated rattlesnake bites), but we all share a general conception 
of the relative dangers of these threats. It is against this background 
conception of general estimates of danger that religious risk taking occurs.
Yet it is possible to change an individual’s estimate of the likelihood that 
various possible outcomes will occur. Given an array of evaluated possible 
outcomes, this may involve making specific positively valued outcomes 
seem more likely or making specific negatively valued ones seem less likely, 
or both, so that a recalculation of the risk would result in a different choice.
Take, for instance, the case of the Christian Scientist with acute
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appendicitis who seeks relief. Like other members of contemporary soci­
ety, he or she will have some background understanding of the likelihood 
of untreated appendicitis’s resulting in death. Although this is by no means 
a scientifically rigorous conception, the person can say, for instance, that 
the likelihood of death is greater in untreated appendicitis than in, for ex­
ample, untreated influenza. However, the teachings of the individual’s 
church persuade him or her that although this background information is 
accepted by nonbelievers and correctly describes the probabilities con­
fronting them, the probabilities are quite different for persons who under­
stand the nonphysical nature of illness and disease, the power of Christian 
Science healing, and the true nature of prayer. The believer holds that 
achieving a correct understanding of “illness” and “disease” as resulting 
from defective mental attitudes will free him or her from them, even when 
the risks would otherwise be very high, and that the way to achieve this 
correct understanding is in prayer. Thus, the Christian Scientist will hold 
that the risk of death from acute appendicitis treated only with Christian 
Science prayer is, in fact, much lower than the shared cultural conception 
would insist; in fact, that it is actually lower not only than the risk from un­
treated appendicitis but lower than the risk in appendicitis treated with 
conventional medicine. Prayer, in this view, is the most effective treatment 
of ail. This shared perception of risk explains why Christian Scientists ex­
hibit similar, though unusual, risk budgets in medical choices of this sort; 
it also invites us to ask how this shared perception of risk is attained.
How does the believing Christian Scientist reach this still lower estimate 
of the probability of death? Let us look at the kind of evidence with which 
the believer is supplied and upon which he or she bases prudential calcula­
tions of risk; these involve alterations of risk budgets and styles.
Support for claims of the efficacy of Christian Science healing, following 
the pattern of assertions made in Science and Health with Key to the Scrip­
tures11 and other writings of Mary Baker Eddy, is provided largely by the tes­
timonials of those who recount the ways in which they have been healed from 
disease or injury. These testimonials are typically quite detailed and fervendy 
sincere in tone; they are direct, firsthand accounts of what is often an ex­
tremely powerful, faith-confirming experience. For example, a woman living 
in the Mojave Desert area of California writes: “On a warm afternoon last 
May while coming into our house through the laundry room (which is part 
of the garage), I felt a sharp pain in my right foot. Looking down, I saw what 
appeared to be a rattlesnake disappearing under the washing machine.”12
She goes on to recount her fear, the assistance of the Christian Science 
practitioner in praying for her recovery, the development and eventual
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subsiding of a discolored, numb swelling on her foot, and the confirming 
effects this experience had upon her faith.
This testimonial is typical of the handful published in each issue of the 
Christian Science Journal, a monthly periodical widely circulated among 
Christian Scientists and, like the weekly Christian Science Sentinel, a pri­
mary source of information about the church. The Journal asserts that “the 
statements made in these testimonies with regard to healings have been 
carefully verified,”13 and that it retains on file the originals of testimonials 
together with the three written verifications or vouchers required for pub­
lication. Between 1900 and 1985, some 53,900 testimonials of healing had 
been published in the periodicals of the church; they are said to be “the 
most important body of evidence concerning Christian Science healing.”14
A careful examination of testimonials published in Christian Science pe­
riodicals between 1971 and 1981, according to a First Church of Christ, 
Scientist, authority defending healing in the New England Journal of 
Medicine, shows “647 testimonies concerning illnesses that had been 
medically diagnosed, in some cases both before and after a healing 
. . . [including] leukemia and other neoplasias, both malignant and be­
nign; diphtheria; gallstones; pernicious anemia; club feet; spinal meningi­
tis; and bone fracture, among numerous others.”15 This figure includes 
137 pediatric cases. Healing in such cases might seem to constitute an im­
pressive record. But the record is wholly anecdotal in form, appealing sim­
ply to isolated cases without reference either to general patterns or trends 
or to comparisons based on control groups. The effect of this kind of in­
formation—independently of whether the claims are actually true—is to 
exacerbate one of the most common errors in decision making under risk.
Many kinds of error are possible in risk-taking choice. Objective errors 
include misidentification of the range of possible outcomes and assignment 
of faulty probabilities to possible outcomes (often as the product of subjec­
tive factors such as unwarranted optimism or pessimism), misidentification 
of the values one assigns to possible outcomes, inconsistent weightings of 
possible outcomes, self-deception, and so on. But there is a common, doc- 
umentable error characteristic of rational choice, frequently discussed with 
reference to informed consent in medical situations. This is the tendency to 
overrely on case information and to underrely on base-rate information.16 
Ordinary patients in ordinary medical contexts do this: They tend to base 
decisions on anecdotal accounts, supplied by physicians, friends, personal 
experience, or other sources, including movies and TV, and to downplay or 
ignore information about the rates of incidence of specific conditions, side 
effects, self-limiting conditions, spontaneous recovery, and so on.
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Whereas ordinary medical patients do this rather naturally, Christian 
Scientists in situations of medical risk are in effect encouraged to do so, 
since they are supplied with information that makes miscalculation in­
evitable. What are not available from the Christian Science church or from 
its publications are data that might counteract this tendency or could con­
tribute to establishing reliable base-rate information: How often, given a 
specific medical condition, does Christian Science healing appear to be 
effective? This question is much easier to answer than, How often is Chris­
tian Science healing actually effective? But no data are available even for the 
easier question about apparent results.
Clearly, 647 documented cases over a ten-year period is sparse evidence, 
in view of the number of Scientists and the frequency within the general 
population of the conditions involved. There might, of course, be many 
undiagnosed, undocumented cases or a lower incidence of the conditions 
among the Christian Science population, but these conjectures do litde to 
provide the Christian Scientist with a reliable sense of the frequency with 
which Christian Science healing, once attempted, is effective. Testimonials 
of failures, of course, are not published in the church’s periodicals.
Yet there is at least some documented information available concerning 
failures. A study of child fatalities associated with religious groups oppos­
ing medical treatment examined the records of 172 children who died 
between 1975 and 1995 in which there was evidence that parents had 
withheld medical care because of reliance on religious rituals or teachings 
and there was sufficient documentation to determine the cause of death.17 
Of the 172 deaths, 140 were from conditions for which survival rates with 
medical care would have exceeded 90 percent, conditions like pneumonia, 
meningitis, aspiration, type 1 diabetes, dehydration, diphtheria, measles, 
appendicitis, and small bowel obstruction. Eighteen more had expected 
survival rates of over 50 percent. Although this study can be challenged on 
design grounds, since calculation of overall mortality rates is not possible 
and the cases were collected in a nonrigorous manner, as the authors rec­
ognize, nevertheless the cases do shed light on the importance of negative 
information. (Interestingly, in this study, Christian Science had a lower 
number of deaths in proportion to the size of its membership than other 
groups studied: the Church of the First Born, End Time Ministries, the 
Faith Assembly, and the Faith Tabernacle.)18
Furthermore, the lack of negative information made available to Chris­
tian Scientists is compounded by false positives—cases in which Christian 
Science healing is credited with the cure of a condition that was self- 
limiting or would have resolved spontaneously anyway—as when the cold
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that vanishes after troubling a person for two weeks is taken as proof that 
Christian Science really works.19 Even the account by the woman bitten 
by the rattlesnake under her washing machine should be seen in light of 
the fact that rattlesnake bites are comparatively seldom fatal, especially at 
distant sites on a limb (the woman was bitten on the foot); but this in­
formation was not provided. Yet it is only with adequate base-rate infor­
mation, making it possible to calculate overall frequencies of success and 
failure in non-self-limiting conditions with given forms of treatment, that 
a person can rationally compare conventional medical treatment with 
Christian Science healing of the same condition, and make a choice in an
To assert that Christian Science healing cannot be chosen on a rational 
basis is, of course, not to assume that Christian Science healing is in fact 
less effective than conventional medical therapy. This point must be con­
ceded by critics of the group, given substantial rates of iatrogenic illness in 
conventional treatment and the fact that a very large proportion (variously 
estimated at 75 or 80 percent) of the “illnesses” initially seen by physicians 
are either self-limiting or psychogenic in origin. Rather, it is to point out 
that the basis on which a Christian Scientist makes a choice in seeking re­
lief from symptoms is not rationally defensible. Christian Science healing 
might, in fact, be more effective than conventional medicine, but even the 
Christian Scientist would have no way of knowing this. Yet the church does 
claim to supply persuasive, empirical evidence for the efficacy of healing; 
this is part of the point of Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures and
But the issue is more complicated than it might appear. Nicholas 
Rescher takes the crucial distinction in risk assessment to be that between 
realistic and unrealistic appraisal.21 Despite the fact that the individual 
Christian Scientist’s choice to rely on Christian Science healing is not ra­
tionally defensible, it cannot be said to be unrealistic in a general sense. 
This is because the individual Scientist has not exaggerated, underesti­
mated, misinterpreted, or otherwise misapprehended or distorted the avail­
able evidence. Given the evidence he or she has, the tools provided for 
assessing it, and the surrounding claim of a trusted institution that the ev­
idence is compelling, he or she makes a subjectively realistic assessment; the 
fault is not the Scientist’s, who is both a believer and a member of the 
church. In fact, the Christian Scientist characteristically believes that such 
a choice is a good, sound decision based on a large body of compelling ev­
idence that, though ignored by non-Scientists, is rationally persuasive. As
My own family has relied on Christian Science for generations. I have never 
considered prayer a gamble. Please understand: Pm not speaking of some 
crude kind o f “faith healing” that implores God to heal and says it was His 
will if nothing happens. I’m speaking of responsible spiritual healing prac­
ticed now over a century by many perfectly normal citizens and caring 
parents.
Pm concerned about not being taken seriously—that nobody in the me­
dia . . .  is really taking into account that these healings have been happening 
over many years. Not just in my family, not just my friends. I’m speaking of 
the massive, long-term experience in a whole denomination.22
If this believer’s assessment of risk, although subjectively realistic, is in 
fact objectively unrealistic, any moral complaint must be directed not pri­
marily against the believer, nor against church teachers and officials, since 
after all they too share the same set of assumptions with the church mem­
bership. Rather, blame rests with the institutional perpetration of the claim 
that the evidence is valid, and the complaint should point out how the en­
couragement of belief in the efficacy of healing rather than objective con­
firmation of it compromises the possibility of autonomous choice. Of 
course, there is fault on both sides. The medical establishment has been as 
uninterested in examining alleged Christian Science healings (being 
generally content to assert that either they were spontaneous recoveries, 
perhaps associated with the placebo effect, or they were inaccurately diag­
nosed in the first place) as Christian Science has been to provide well- 
documented evidence, in particular evidence scrutinized under contrary 
hypotheses.
But there is a further complexity to the risks Christian Scientists take in 
choosing healing over conventional medical treatment. Not all healing is 
successful; some people remain incapacitated, some are sent to Christian 
Science sanitariums or nursing homes, and some die. Christian Science 
teaching explains this at least in part as the result of a failure on the part of 
the patient to understand fully his or her own nature as a spiritual being or 
to pray adequately for release from incorrect attitudes; the devout Scientist 
believes that the risk of death from “disease” correctly understood and 
adequately prayed for is nil. But the Scientist, devout or otherwise, is not 
encouraged to assess, in making risk-taking choices, how likely it is that he 
or she will correctly understand and adequately pray for release from the 
condition. This crucially relevant factor in a prudential risk calculation un­
der these religious assumptions is simply not brought into question or dis­
cussed, nor is any evidence bearing on it, anecdotal or otherwise, provided. 
How often does the explanation of a patient’s failure to recover appeal to 
the claim that the patient failed to pray appropriately or had the wrong
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attitude? This information too is of great relevance in risk-taking choices, 
yet it is nowhere forthcoming.
Furthermore (although there is some lack of agreement on this issue)23 
Christian Science generally holds that healing through prayer is incom­
patible with conventional medical treatment, since prayer consists in 
achieving an understanding of the nature of disease that contradicts the 
causal, physicalist assumptions of medicine. Stories abound of people be­
ing denied continuation of the services of a Christian Science practitioner 
if they also enter the care of a physician. Patients who enter Christian Sci­
ence sanitariums receive care only from nurses who are members of the 
church and from church practitioners; the nurses are prohibited from do­
ing anything “material” to evaluate or relieve disease and suffering.24 
Thus, although conventional physicians are quick to recognize the psy­
chotherapeutic value of ordinary prayer by the patient, whatever advan­
tages might accrue to the ordinary patient from a combination of medical 
treatment and religiously supported hope are not available to the Chris­
tian Scientist. Rather, the Scientist is forced to make a choice between 
therapies without knowing whether the chance of survival with both kinds 
of therapy is better or worse than with only one or the other. Christian 
Science periodicals do not print testimonials from persons who see doc­
tors as well as healers, any more than they do from persons who see 
doctors alone.
The institutional practice of altering persons’ risk budgets by providing 
only anecdotal information unaccompanied by base-rate data, as Christian 
Science does, and by ignoring the incidence of failed cases and of any spe­
cial conditions that must obtain for the supposed course of action to be 
effective, fails to satisfy yet a third basic initial criterion for autonomous 
choice: Not only must it be voluntary and rationally unimpaired, as we’ve 
seen, but it must also be adequately informed. It is true that anecdotal in­
formation of the kind provided in Christian Science periodicals can be 
extremely effective in stirring faith and may be of great significance in a per­
son’s life. It may well produce a sizable placebo effect. And it is possible 
that Christian Science healing is actually efficacious, even in cases of non­
self-limiting, serious illness. But insofar as merely anecdotal information is 
put forward as the evidence for claims of efficacy in healing and as a basis 
for refusing conventional medical treatment, it is clearly an inadequate ba­
sis upon which to encourage people to take such substantial risks. Neither 
their reliance on religious healing nor their refusal of conventional medical 
treatment meets the conditions for “informed consent.” Hence, if we are 
to assess the practices of this church in the same way we would assess those
of medicine or other secular professions that encourage people to take 
life-threatening risks without granting them the right to give informed 
consent, we would be tempted to say that they involve manipulation, cal­
lousness, or deceit.
The analysis given here of evidentiary claims concerning the efficacy of 
nonmedical healing applies not only to Christian Science but to any reli­
gious group that appeals to alternative varieties of healing, whether the 
healing involves denominational practitioners, faith healers, or the assumed 
direct influence of a divine being. The Faith Assembly, for instance, regards 
Jesus as the sole physician, but (at least if the scant evidence available con­
cerning this group is correct) relies on much the same persuasive structures 
(where it does not directly coerce) Christian Science uses to produce ac­
ceptance of its claim. So do individual faith healers of various sorts, groups 
such as the Church of the First Born and the Faith Tabernacle Congrega­
tion, and many of the contemporary “televangelist” preachers. Methods 
used to further beliefs about the efficacy of healing at such institutions as 
the Roman Catholic shrine at Lourdes might also bear inquiry, as well as 
the practices of groups that accept faith healing but do not reject conven­
tional medical treatment, such as the Assemblies of God and certain 
charismatic subgroups of Catholicism and Anglicanism. Thus, although 
Christian Science may provide the most conspicuous example of a certain 
sort of religious intervention in high-risk decision making, it has many fea­
tures in common with other groups; ethical censure, if it is appropriate at 
all, ought hardly be reserved for this group alone.
The Doctrinal Status of Risk Taking
To show that risk-taking religious conduct occurs in various forms and 
with various amounts of risk in various religious groups—including Chris­
tian Science—is not yet to reach a normative conclusion. It cannot simply 
be assumed that making a decision in which one risks death is wrong, nor 
can it be assumed that there is something wrong with the mechanisms that 
religious groups employ to influence people in making these decisions— 
however extreme the risks, however manipulative the manner of encour­
aging them, and however severe the consequences for both the risk taker 
and for others. These are the features that an examination of religious prac­
tices using professional ethics exposes; yet to identify features is not to 
establish that they are morally intolerable, since such conduct is governed 
not only by moral considerations but also by the doctrines, teachings, and 
authoritative pronouncements of the specific religious groups.
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In my volume Ethics in the Sanctuary, I developed a typology to dis­
tinguish various levels of doctrinal assertions with respect to the ethical 
dilemmas involved.25 The typology recognizes four distinct levels or 
orders of doctrinal assertions: 0-order or base-level doctrines, the funda­
mental imperatives of a group (often, though not always, stated in scrip­
tural texts); first-order doctrines or teachings, which stipulate ways of 
putting basic imperatives into practice but characteristically generate new 
moral problems in doing so; second-order doctrines or teachings, which 
establish a position that attempts to resolve the ethical problems presented 
by first-order doctrines; and third-order doctrines or teachings, which 
function as excuses for residual moral problems. This four-level typology 
provides a basis for distinguishing the more fundamental religious imper­
atives of a group from dictates that, though they may have achieved sim­
ilar doctrinal status, exhibit later historical or theoretical development 
within a tradition and are best viewed as “answers” to and “excuses” for 
the moral problems posed by the fundamental imperatives and the ways 
they are put into practice. Because of their derivative status, whatever 
doctrinal position they may enjoy, they are to be treated as initially more 
vulnerable to ethical review than the basic imperatives of the tradition 
within which they arise.
In surveying the huge variety of risk-taking practices evident among 
various Christian and Christian-influenced groups, this typology serves to 
differentiate between those risk-taking dictates that are more vulnerable 
and those that are less vulnerable to ethical criticism. Of course, since the 
risk-taking practices in these groups—including Christian Science—do not 
form a coherent, unified, single tradition but occur in a spectrum of 
denominations and sects with different histories, application of this typol­
ogy will not be completely tidy or uniform. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify doctrines, directives, teachings, and other authoritative pro­
nouncements at all four levels.
In these religious settings, some people take risks, including physical 
risks, and some of these risks eventuate badly: some persons suffer serious 
damage to their health; some die. The topology employed here reveals a 
further level of doctrinal, quasi-doctrinal, or authoritative claim, identi­
fied as third-order doctrine, that provides “excuses” for the residual moral 
problems generated by the practices in question. For instance, when a 
Christian Scientist practicing his or her beliefs by relying on healing re­
fuses conventional medical treatment and dies, some account consistent 
with both the basic doctrinal imperative and with the first- and second- 
order teachings is needed to explain or justify the negative outcome.
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Similarly, since serpent handlers act to honor the assertion in Mark 16 
that “they will pick up snakes in their hands, and if they drink any deadly 
thing, it will not hurt them,” the group’s continued acceptance of the 
basic religious imperative depends in part on providing a doctrinally ac­
ceptable account of how snake bites and snake bite fatalities can occur, 
that is, an excuse for the negative outcome resulting from the risks a per­
son takes in relying on the scriptural assurance that no harm will come 
from handling snakes.
These third-order teachings or excuses for failed risks are usually easy to 
identify, though they are not always encoded in official doctrine. When a 
Christian Scientist who refuses medical treatment and relies on prayer 
worsens or dies, the most frequent explanation is that he or she failed to 
pray adequately and hence failed to achieve the proper understanding of 
the nature of disease. Similarly, the Faith Assembly member who dies after 
refusing treatment is said to have lacked faith in Jesus’ power to heal— 
an accusation so prevalent in this group that its founder, Hobart Freeman, 
extended it even to those who use automobile seat belts. The serpent han­
dler who is bitten is sometimes said to have failed to be sure of being gen­
uinely anointed before taking up the snakes.
Just as it is easy to identify these third-order teachings or excuses for 
the negative outcomes that a group’s risk-taking practices have brought 
about, it is also easy to see a feature that is common to many of them: 
They explain the negative outcome as a result of a failure on the part of 
the individual harmed. This is true in the Faith Assembly, the Holiness 
Church, and Christian Science. In examining the excuses various groups 
encode in their doctrines, we can begin by considering whether excuses 
that lay the blame for unsuccessful risk taking at the feet of the risk taker 
are themselves morally defensible, or whether a defensible excuse must be 
of some other form.
In contrast, the Jehovah’s Witnesses appear to offer no excuse when a 
Witness refuses transfusion and dies. However, under the reevaluation that 
is characteristic of Jehovah’s Witness practice, there is nothing to excuse. 
The faithful Witness who dies because he or she refuses blood—according 
to the teachings of the group—nevertheless achieves salvation, which, un­
der the reevaluation, is the maximally valued outcome the choice could 
yield. Consequently, for the devout, the death need not be excused. The 
issue, then, is whether Christian Science is like this, or whether Christian 
Science involves a pragmatic attempt to achieve cure: Does Christian Sci­
ence involve praying for a cure, or praying for its own sake, believing—but 
not centrally intending—that this might also result in cure?
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The Moral Evaluation of Risk Taking in Religion
Examining the practices of Christian Science and other groups suggests an 
immediate conclusion: that these practices involving risks cannot be 
morally defended, and, furthermore, that they should be denounced on 
moral grounds. In Ethics in the Sanctuary, I argue that the developed prac­
tices and teachings of religious groups, as distinct from their fundamental 
imperatives, are vulnerable to ethical critique. And when we now look at 
these practices in a variety of groups, including Christian Science, we see 
that they involve clear abuses of identifiable, uncontroversial moral princi­
ple. Examining issues in confidentiality in many groups, for example, 
Catholics, Mormons, and fundamentalist groups like the Collinsville 
Church of Christ, we find practices that variously involve lying, noncon­
senting disclosure, manipulation, and allowing serious, preventable 
harms.26 Thus risk taking in a variety of groups involves coercion, impair­
ment of rational capacities, manipulation, callousness, and deception. No 
doubt we could look further and find more. But to identify these apparent 
moral abuses is not to establish that they are abuses in religious contexts; we 
have only seen them this way because we instinctively appeal to principles 
familiar in secular life. Even though we have established that certain reli­
gious doctrines and practices are open to ethical evaluation, we cannot sim­
ply assume that the principles presupposed by this catalogue of apparent 
abuses are applicable here.
Of the moral principles that these apparent abuses seem to violate, au­
tonomy is central. This principle is highlighted by the strategy of using the 
apparatus of professional ethics to examine issues of religious risk taking, in 
particular, the concept of informed consent. The principle of autonomy, re­
ceived in both its Kantian form and in the utilitarian version defended by 
John Stuart Mill, is seldom contested in either ordinary or professional 
ethics, though there certainly are continuing, vigorous debates about how it 
should be interpreted, about the degree to which individuals are capable of 
genuine autonomy, and about when, if ever, the principle may be overrid­
den. This principle has been central in contemporary professional ethics. 
Here too disagreement virtually or nearly exclusively concerns the conditions 
under which paternalistic or harm-based exceptions to the principle are 
legitimate; there are few real challenges to the principle of autonomy itself
Do these religious practices violate the principle of autonomy and thus 
undercut the possibility of informed consent? Though they are often ex­
plicated within professional ethics in more elaborate ways, the conditions 
for autonomous choice involve three criteria: (1) the decision must be
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uncoerced, (2) it must be rationally unimpaired, and (3) it must be ade­
quately informed. But, as we have seen, these are precisely the conditions 
that the practices of these various groups violate.27 The Faith Assembly, at 
least on some occasions, coerces its members into refusing medical treat­
ment. The Holiness serpent-handling groups encourage making poten­
tially fatal decisions about handling snakes under extreme emotional 
impairment, calling that condition an “anointment” for taking the risk. 
Christian Science provides selective, anecdotal information only, without 
base or failure rates, in a way that is inevitably deceptive in influencing a 
high-risk choice. Nor is it apparent that these interferences in autonomous 
choice can be excused on the ground of limiting risks to third parties or for 
compelling paternalist reasons. Thus, since these practices are vulnerable 
to ethical critique and the infractions of the principle of autonomy are so 
clear, it would seem that moral conclusions could be drawn readily.
But I do not think this is so. Because our apparatus for evaluating reli­
gious practice is not yet complete, the principle of autonomy cannot be 
directly employed. Upper-level doctrines and practices are candidates for 
critique; but we have yet to establish on what basis the critique can be 
made. To condemn practices for violating conditions of autonomous 
choice involves an unwarranted leap in ethical evaluation, even though 
these criteria are well established in both professional and ordinary ethics. 
It is a leap we can make—in limited ways—only after our initial typology 
is supplemented with the appropriate critical principle.
The principle to which we shall appeal, the fiduciary principle, is a dis­
tinct moral principle not reducible either to that of autonomy or to those 
of nonmaleficence and beneficence. Most explicidy articulated in law, it is 
vaguely recognized in various forms in all of the secular professions. The 
fiduciary principle serves to identify the obligations of the professional vis- 
a-vis the client in professional contexts and, except for a few distinctive 
interpersonal relationships, it is usually thought to be limited to profes­
sional contexts.
To employ a principle adopted from professional ethics to examine or­
ganized religion is not to presuppose that religious functionaries are all 
professionals in the fullest sense. Clergy of the mainstream denominations 
have traditionally been regarded in this way, though cult leaders, evange­
lists, faith healers, gurus, and the like have not. Although the fiduciary prin­
ciple has been developed in professional contexts, its scope is broader and 
provides a crucial distinction in assessing religious practice.
The fiduciary principle, which applies to all aspects of professional-client 
interaction, regulates practice by stipulating that it must be possible for the
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client to trust the professional in the course of the interaction, even though 
the professional’s own interests may conflict with those of the client. Put 
another way, the fiduciary principle prohibits the professional from taking 
advantage of the client—violating the client’s rights or harming his or her 
interests—in the course of the professional relationship, though the pro­
fessional’s superior status, power, and knowledge would maJke it easy to do 
so. For example, the lawyer has fiduciary duties to the client; this means 
that the lawyer must use his or her professional skills to advance the client’s 
interests or, at least, not to harm them. Similarly, the trustee, as fiduciary 
to the beneficiary of a trust fund, must refrain from usurping the benefi­
ciary’s interests in the fund, just as the director of a corporation must 
refrain from promoting his or her own interests at the expense of the cor­
poration. The fiduciary principle may seem similar to the more general 
principle of nonmaleficence, but it has a specific application to the profes­
sional-client relationship and to the characteristic imbalance of power this 
relationship exhibits. It is broader in scope than the comparatively narrow 
principle of autonomy; it requires the professional not only to respect the 
client’s autonomous choices and to protect the client’s capacity to make 
them but also to ensure (and this does not rule out paternalistic interven­
tion) that the client’s interests are served. Thus, the principle is a complex 
one, with conditions often in tension between autonomist and paternalist 
demands, and it is not reducible to the simpler principles often cited in pro­
fessional and ordinary moral discourse. To say, as Charles Fried does, that 
the fiduciary “owes a duty of strict and unreserved loyalty to his client”28 
is correct and makes it clear that the professional’s primary obligation is to 
the client, not the professional’s own interests, the institution, or others 
who might be involved. But the question of how the sometimes conflict­
ing requirements of this complex principle are to be satisfied is left open.
Inasmuch as the fiduciary principle has autonomist components, the 
three conditions for the protection of autonomous choice identified 
above—noncoercion, freedom from rational impairment, and adequate in­
formedness—can all be derived from it, though in some circumstances they 
may be in tension with paternalist components of the principle. In profes­
sional areas such as medicine and law, these three conditions protect the 
client from the professional in very specific ways. The client, it is assumed, 
consults the professional in order to advance his or her aims and interests; 
the protection needed is protection from possible dishonesty, manipula­
tion, or greed on the part of the professional. For instance, when the pa­
tient consults the doctor for help in curing an illness, he or she occupies an 
unequal, vulnerable position in the relationship (the patient, after all, is
both sick and untrained in medicine) and must rely on the physician’s 
obligations as fiduciary to keep from being made worse off, specifically, 
from being made worse off with respect to health. The legal client consults 
an attorney for help in protecting his or her rights and similarly relies on 
the attorney’s fiduciary obligation to a client. Since the attorney is far more 
skilled in the law than the client, the attorney could easily jeopardize the 
client’s rights. Professionals are also often in a position to jeopardize other 
interests of the client (both doctors and lawyers, for instance, can easily 
threaten a patient’s or client’s emotional, social, or financial weli-being), 
but it is with respect to the specific interest or set of interests about which 
the client has consulted the professional that the fiduciary principle most 
directly applies.
Like other professionals, the religious professional, whether minister, 
priest, rabbi, pastor, evangelist, faith healer, or guru, is in a position to 
make individuals within the group either better or worse off. He or she can 
affect their emotional, social, financial, or other peripheral interests. The 
religious professional can also affect, either positively or negatively, the spe­
cific aim or interest for which they seek help in the first place; it is this fact 
that initially supports the appeal to the fiduciary principle made here. What 
the fiduciary principle requires is that the priest or the preacher not treat 
those who come as prey, even in the most subtle ways, or use them either 
for self-interested ends or other institutional goals but instead remain wor­
thy of trust.
To construe the relation between the religious professional and mem­
ber of the religious group in this way invites us to identify precisely what it 
is that the religious believer comes to the religious professional for, that is, 
what interests he or she hopes to serve in approaching the religious pro­
fessional. Although this may be very difficult to do for a specific case, we 
can venture certain general observations. Consider, for instance, the rea­
sons why the Christian Scientist or a member of the Faith Assembly has 
contact with the leaders of his or her group, as contrasted with the reasons 
why, for example, a member of a serpent-handling group might do so. The 
Christian Scientist calls a practitioner when he or she is ill and does so for 
help in restoring health. Similarly, the member of the Faith Assembly re­
jects medicine and relies on Jesus in order to get well, but he or she also 
acts to retain membership and avoid humiliation by the group. The serpent 
handler, on the other hand, attends a prayer meeting and handles serpents 
in order to satisfy the injunction he or she believes Mark 16 states; there is 
less evidence here of some particular external objective. Then again, the 
Jehovah’s Witness appears to refuse blood in order to satisfy a biblical
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commandment, much as the serpent handler does, but does so in order not 
to jeopardize his or her chances of salvation.
Of course, identifying reasons why people engage in religion is a murky 
business at best; a full psychological explanation of such behaviors is far 
more complex than can be treated here. Nevertheless, it is evident that 
strikingly different degrees of rational prudence, in the pursuit of self­
interest, are exhibited by the members of various groups. The Christian 
Scientist seeks to get well, just as any ordinary patient seeing any ordinary 
doctor does; in doing so, the Scientist acts to promote one of his or her in­
terests—health. The Scientist does not call the condition “illness” nor rec­
ognize its symptoms as those of “disease,” nor does he or she understand 
the end state sought to be a “cure” but rather a “demonstration” of the 
truth of the principles of Christian Science. Indeed, the Scientist rejects the 
entire causal metaphysics of medicine. Nevertheless, he or she accepts, and 
the church promotes, a variety of external similarities, many dating from 
the earliest period of the church,29 reinforcing the claim that what the be­
liever seeks is what any ordinary patient seeks: help in regaining health. For 
instance, the Christian Scientist calls the practitioner only when he or she 
has discomforting symptoms (whether or not viewed as symptoms of “dis­
ease”). The practitioner can be found by looking in the Yellow Pages; an 
appointment is made; the practitioner’s services are paid for at rates 
roughly comparable to those of a physician; and, in some states (Massa­
chusetts, for instance) Blue Cross will pay the bill. To put it another way, 
Christian Science functions as an alternative health care system, though it 
denies medicine’s metaphysics and makes no use of medical techniques; we 
can easily identify the professional institution to which Christian Science 
promotes itself as an alternative. But in doing so, the way in which Chris­
tian Science encourages risk taking is different from that of many other 
religious groups.
Not all risk-taking practices function as alternatives to secular profes­
sional institutions. The serpent handler, for example, does not so clearly 
seek to advance his or her interests by risking health or life but instead acts 
simply to obey an injunction he or she believes is what the Lord demands. 
There do not seem to be external similarities promoted by the group that 
would reinforce the claim that in handling snakes the believer attempts to 
further the same aims and interests that clients of other professionals do. 
Serpent handling is not an alternative anything; it is simply a practice of 
the group.
Noting these differences should allow us to see why the fiduciary prin­
ciple, although vaguely asserted in the secular professions, is not dis­
cussed much there and why, in contrast, it is of particular interest in the 
religious sphere. The fiduciary principle prohibits the professional from 
violating moral principles in a way that would undermine those aims or 
interests for which a client seeks protection or advancement in using the 
professional’s services. In medicine and law, as in other secular profes­
sions, this covers the entire range of cases: Patients and legal clients use 
the services of doctors and lawyers in order to protect and advance their 
own aims or interests, or those of organizations and causes with which 
they identify, and generally not for any other reason. They come to 
lawyers and doctors to protect their rights, broadly construed, or to get 
well. Since virtually all of the activities in which the professional engages 
with the client are initiated in response to such purposes on the part of 
the client, there is nothing distinctive in these areas of professional prac­
tice that the fiduciary principle might isolate and identify as protected un­
der this principle. Of course, some clients do not voluntarily consult pro­
fessionals but are delivered to them, such as the unconscious emergency 
patient or the impoverished defendant in the criminal justice system. But 
even in these circumstances the fiduciary principle applies by extension. 
On some occasions a client might consult a professional for purposes that 
do not appear to serve his or her self-interests, as, for example, when a 
person consults a doctor to donate a kidney to someone else. But even 
here the patient does so with the aim of protecting his or her interests as 
well as those of the recipient and does not ask the doctor to remove the 
kidney without regard for his or her own health. Even if the fiduciary 
principle is not particularly conspicuous in the secular professions, largely 
because it covers virtually all available cases, it will nevertheless play a cen­
tral role in sorting out those cases in religion to which ordinary moral 
norms apply and those to which they do not.
The fiduciary principle functions in critiquing religious practice by iden­
tifying under what conditions upper-level practices and doctrines may be 
reviewed with the moral principles available in professional and ordinary 
ethics—such principles as autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence. 
Although the working typology employed earlier makes it possible to dis­
tinguish between fundamental, 0-level imperatives and upper-level, devel­
oped doctrines and practices, it does not specify whether all of the latter 
are actually open to critique. The fiduciary principle functions as a second 
general principle, supplementing the earlier typology, and further limits 
the application of moral norms to religious practices. The fiduciary princi­
ple itself does not aid in sorting out conflicts and tensions between the de­
mands of autonomy, nonmaleficence, and beneficence, either in general or
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in specific cases; this is work for the applied professional ethicist concerned 
with organized religion, the “ecclesioethicist,” to do. But the principle 
does tell us when the ecclesioethicist can get to work, by telling us under 
what conditions the basic moral principles can be applied to upper-level 
doctrines and practices. In religious contexts, the fiduciary principle asserts 
that the developed practices, doctrines, methods, and teachings employed by re­
ligious professionals or their religious organizations must meet (secular) eth­
ical criteria wherever the individual participates in these practices to advance 
his or her self-interests. The fact that the religious professional is religious 
does not exempt him or her from treating clients in ways that are morally 
binding in the secular professions, as well as in ordinary morality, when­
ever the client approaches the religious professional for the same sorts of 
self-interest-serving purposes for which he or she would approach a secu­
lar professional—even if the client is also a believer and adherent of the 
group. For example, if the Christian Scientist seeks help from a Christian 
Scientist practitioner in order to get well, then he or she is entitled to the 
same freedom from coercion, from impairment, and to the same adequate 
information to which an ordinary medical patient would be entitled in 
seeking to get well. In a word, the religious believer, like the medical pa­
tient, is entitled to the protections of informed consent; the believer’s sta­
tus as a believer does not abrogate this right. However, if a believer ap­
proaches a Christian Science practitioner not to get well but in order to 
deepen his or her faith, as many devout Christian Scientists clearly do, then 
it is not so clear that these constraints apply. Many Christian Scientists con­
ceive of healing not as an alternative medical system at all but as a process 
of prayer that is part of the effort to achieve a certain spiritual condition. A 
side effect of that process, though not its central purpose, may be the 
restoration of health.30 It is indeed crucial whether the Christian Scientist 
is praying for a cure or praying for the sake of praying, though believing
It may seem that the religious organization, or the religious professional 
within it, can have no such fiduciary obligation, inasmuch as neither the 
professional nor the organization has control over the reasons for which an 
individual approaches them. This is not so, of course, for the way in which 
a religious organization, including its officials, is approached is very much 
a function of the way in which it announces or advertises itself. After all, 
announcing or advertising an organization is an interactive process be­
tween the organization and the individuals who approach it. The process 
is not much remarked upon in the secular professions, since most secular 
professions announce themselves in uniform ways, but it is a process of
tremendous variability in religion. Christian Science, for instance, an­
nounces and promotes itself as an alternative healing system by the very fact 
that it distributes testimonials that recount favorable recoveries using 
Christian Science healing (even though these testimonials are described 
primarily as serving to give thanks to God) and by asking Blue Cross to 
cover the services it renders. In response to the way in which Christian Sci­
ence announces and promotes itself, prospective users of the church 
approach it in kind, seeking to receive these services in order to further 
their aims and interests in getting well. The fact that prospective users of 
Christian Science healing, both members and prospective converts, seek to 
further their aims and interests in getting well leads the church and its of­
ficials to promote the church’s services in this way. Similarly, for example, 
the Church of Scientology promotes itself as providing help in achieving 
psychological stability and growth; in this sense, it attempts to function as 
an alternative psychotherapeutic profession. As in Christian Science, Sci­
entology’s public stance is interactive with the aims and purposes for which 
prospective users of its services approach the church: It announces itself as 
able to provide psychological help and personality development, and peo­
ple who seek these things turn to it.
In the secular professions, when we talk about a client’s reasons for seek­
ing a professional, we are saying as much about the professional and the 
background organization as we are about the client. Thus, to phrase the 
fiduciary principle in terms of what the client seeks is also to identify spe­
cific professional and institutional postures. In religion, since the fiduciary 
principle underwrites the application of standard ethical principles (for 
example, the bioethics canon of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, 
and justice) when adherents approach with self-interested aims, it thus also 
underwrites the application of these principles when the religious group 
and its officials announce themselves as available to help persons pursue 
their interests.
O f course, virtually all religious invitation may contain some appeal to 
self-interest. Insofar as a group makes such an invitation, however, under 
the interpretation of the fiduciary principle advanced here, it is obligated 
to protect and promote the aims and self-interests to which the invitation 
is directed. The church that announces itself as able to satisfy certain in­
terests of persons who are attracted to the church in this way opens itself 
to secular moral critique of the practices and doctrines it employs in satis­
fying those interests. Not all of the upper-order practices in a religious 
group will be susceptible to ethical critique under the fiduciary principle; 
but many of those that have been traditionally protected by the notion of
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religious immunity will be clear targets for ethical examination and can be 
assessed using the secular moral criteria developed in ordinary and profes­
sional ethics. (Curiously, the distinction between upper-level practices that 
are vulnerable to ethical critique and those that are not is reflected, though 
somewhat crudely, in the growing area of clergy malpractice insurance. 
Malpractice insurance is available in approximately those areas in which 
clergy do what other professionals do, especially counseling, but not for 
practices much less directly related to the satisfaction of individual self­
interests, such as the performance of rites, the maintenance of beliefs, or 
the upholding of orthodoxy.) The distinction is not always clear; most 
groups give off mixed signals and are approached for mixed reasons. Nev­
ertheless, the theoretical importance of this distinction is considerable.
I began with a discussion of the practices of various religious groups in 
encouraging their adherents to take risks, focusing particularly on Chris­
tian Science. In this discussion, appeal has been made to both general 
moral principles, such as autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and jus­
tice, and to their application in requirements such as informed consent. I 
argued that upper-level practices such as these, which encourage risk, are 
candidates for moral critique, but I did not demonstrate why critique is ap­
propriate in these specific cases. Use of the fiduciary principle provides an 
answer. At least in the case of the Christian Science, Jehovah’s Witnesses, 
and the Holiness churches, there is good reason to think that individuals 
consult religious professionals to promote their own interests and that 
these groups promote characteristic practices under a corresponding appeal 
to self-interest of the members of the group. Christian Scientists choose 
prayer over medicine in order to get well; the church promotes prayer as a 
means of healing. The Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood to avoid preclud­
ing salvation; this church and its officials promote the practice of refusing 
blood at least in part with this rationale. If it turns out that the serpent han­
dler does not act to obey the biblical commandment but simply seeks the 
heightened sensory or emotional experience provided by the dangerous 
thrill of handling snakes, then this too belongs under ordinary ethical 
scrutiny. After all, heightened sensory or emotional experience is available 
in ways that are less life threatening.
Applications of the fiduciary principle in organized religion are not 
likely to be easy in practice. The principle refers to the reasons for which 
people use religious services, as induced by the religious organization and 
vice versa, and these reasons may be multifarious and obscure. Nor can we 
assume that the reasons for which people consult religious professionals 
are as uniform as the reasons for which they consult doctors or lawyers.
Individuals go to church or see their ministers for an enormous variety of 
reasons, including relieving anxiety, coping with fear, preserving a mar­
riage, restoring health, increasing security, dealing with grief, curbing ag­
gressive or suicidal impulses, maintaining social standing, and so on. A 
very large part of what leads the religious believer to a religious profes­
sional involves the protection and advancement of interests like these; a 
very large part of the comforts that religious groups offer are directed to­
ward the satisfaction of these interests. Self-interested religious behavior 
may be very difficult to distinguish from self-interested nonreligious be­
havior. However cumbersome applications of the principle might be in 
practice and, consequently, however poor a basis it might make for policy 
formation, it is an appropriate basis for distinguishing those religious 
activities and practices that are proper targets for ethical critique from 
those that are comparatively immune.
It is also a proper basis for scrutinizing the way that religious groups ad­
vertise themselves and their services, both in securing continuing commit­
ment from their members and in attracting new ones. The televangelist 
groups and their leaders are particularly revealing targets for scrutiny. Oral 
Roberts, for example, makes a direct appeal to the financial interests of 
prospective contributors by promising immediate material reward. Roberts 
has sent multicolored prayer sheets to his “prayer partners” to be mailed 
back (together with a contribution) with a list of needs for which he can 
pray: “The RED area is for your SPIRITUAL healing; the WHITE area is 
for your PHYSICAL healing; the GREEN area is for your FINANCIAL 
healing. Check the needs you have and RUSH them back to me.”31 
Roberts is by no means the only media preacher who announces his brand 
of religion as likely to enhance a believer’s interests in material comfort and 
financial success. But because televangelists invite persons to approach 
them for the same sorts of reasons for which they might approach a secu­
lar financial counselor or investment firm, they are open to the same sort 
of ethical critique. In general, religious operatives promising satisfaction of 
their audience’s financial interests provide a ripe field for further inquiry.
However, not all individuals approach religious professionals or organi­
zations to promote their own self-interests. Consider, for instance, the per­
son who sees a minister or goes to church in order to “strengthen my 
faith.” This seemingly central religious purpose bears close scrutiny, for it 
must be asked why the believer wants to strengthen this faith. If, for in­
stance, it is evident that the believer seeks assistance in strengthening faith 
to “be sure to go to heaven,” the motive sounds very much like the kind 
of self-interest that other forms of rational prudence display. Once it is
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assumed or believed that there is a heaven, then it is not so much a matter 
of religion to want to get there; it is a matter of rational prudence, espe­
cially if the only available alternative under this particular belief system is 
hell. Consequently, even the apparendy religious purpose of strengthening 
one’s faith in consulting a religious professional or participating in religious 
practices falls under the fiduciary principle just articulated. Hence, the pro­
fessional’s methods of providing these services and the established church 
practices that support them are subject to the same working moral criteria 
as other areas of professional ethics, at least if we assume that the religious 
professional is in any way capable of either advancing or undermining the 
interests a person seeks to advance.
This conclusion does not mean, however, that the same local principles 
or rules of professional ethics apply in religion as they do in medicine or 
law. Although the fiduciary principle may provide a basic moral standard 
for all areas of professional practice, including organized religion, it may be 
that specific applications of the principles derived from it, as well as local 
rules such as confidentiality and truth telling, differ from one area of pro­
fessional practice to another. Thus, for example, principles governing the 
protection of autonomy in decision making under risk may differ from psy­
chiatry to medicine to sports coaching to religion, but they must all satisfy 
the general fiduciary requirement that the professional be loyal to the client 
and not take advantage of him or her.
Although having one’s faith strengthened in order to get to heaven may 
not be a distinctively religious purpose for consulting a religious profes­
sional, some purposes are. A person who initially expresses a desire for help 
in strengthening faith might explain that she seeks this help because God is 
supremely worthy of worship and therefore she wishes to worship God 
more fully—regardless of the impact this fuller worship might have on her. 
This kind of purpose in seeking assistance from a religious professional does 
not involve seeking to advance one’s own interests, thereby putting oneself 
in a position vulnerable to the professional’s influence. Consequently, it is 
not a purpose to which the usual strictures of professional morality under 
the fiduciary principle apply. For instance, some Christian Scientists, as per­
haps some Faith Assembly members, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Holiness Church 
members, members of the Church of the First Born, End Time Ministries, 
Faith Tabernacle, or others, may observe their church’s teaching not to en­
hance their health or to secure salvation but simply because they believe it 
to be the word of God. As yet, we have no basis for applying secular moral 
criteria in cases like these, regardless of the nature of these practices and 
doctrines that have developed or the group’s methods in promoting this
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behavior. (This is not, of course, to say that they are justified.) However, 
these cases may be very few, and such people as rare as saints. If most reli­
gious behavior is actually the pursuit of self-interest under a special set of 
metaphysical assumptions, then the “professionals” who are the purveyors 
and caretakers of these assumptions in the form of religious doctrine, teach­
ings, and practices are obligated, as in any fiduciary relationship, to protect 
persons in that pursuit. Christian Science is no exception.
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Margaret P. Battin
Christian Science, I’ve argued, raises compelling moral issues about the 
ways in which religious groups treat their members. To be sure, Christian 
Science is hardly alone in this respect—many religious groups raise 
troubling issues of this sort—but Christian Science presses the issue of “in­
formed consent” in accepting and refusing medical treatment in a particu­
larly acute way. I see this as a troubling ethical dilemma.
Peggy DesAutels, in her important, spirited reply to my charge, argues 
that this is not the problem I think it is. She claims that the worldviews of 
the Christian Scientist and the non-Scientist are at odds. One is “matter 
based,” as it might be put, the other “spirit based.” Thus, she argues, we 
cannot impose ordinary ethical expectations of informed consent on the 
church, on its practitioners, or on its believing members who seek help in 
easing or curing their illnesses by turning to Christian Science prayer.
I think DesAutels’s argument fails. It fails because Christian Science still 
seems to want to have it both ways—to function both as a system of alter­
native medical treatment and, at the same time, as a religious system rooted 
in distinctive metaphysical beliefs about the nature of body and mind; this 
is the dual “pitch” made to long-term members and prospective converts 
alike.1 But DesAutels’s argument is so sensitive to the beliefs of practicing 
Christian Scientists that I’d like to try to draw out the consequences of 
what she says as a way of showing what the real dilemma is, as I see it, for 
Christian Science in the contemporary world. DesAutels undercuts her 
own argument, I believe, by treating it as the end of the conversation. Hav­
ing argued that Scientists and non-Scientists are operating from two
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different worldviews, she takes that to be the end of the matter; but I think 
that she instead introduces new, larger issues. Thus her remarks should be 
treated as the beginning of a further conversation, to be pursued here, not 
as the end of the current one.
Let me get right to the point. My challenge to Christian Science was, in 
essence, a “put-up-or-shut-up” one—either prove that Christian Science 
healing is effective or stop making the claim that it is effective and, fur­
thermore, stop employing practical strategies (e.g., charging fees for heal­
ing and having Blue Cross pay the bill2) that suggest that it is effective. The 
ethical challenge posed to Christian Science requires that it face a practical 
dilemma that looks like this:
Christian Science must either
1. prove the effectiveness of Christian Science healing
2. or abandon all self-presentation that Christian Science healing is ef­
fective.
Not to do one or the other of these, I have argued, is a violation of 
what would in other areas be called professional responsibility and would 
in particular violate canons of informed consent. It is morally wrong to 
encourage people—either current church members or prospective con­
verts—to use Christian Science healing in preference to conventional 
medicine to cure their ills if you cannot provide them with adequate in­
formation, specifically including information about the rates of effective­
ness of the two forms of treatment, for making such a choice. It is wrong, 
in other words, to claim that prayer is a “more dependable form of heal­
ing”3 if you cannot actually establish that this is the case. The church does 
attempt to present its views (for example by preparing videos for para­
medics or other medical personnel who might come in contact with Chris­
tian Scientists), but this is a long way from providing testable, scientifically 
confirmable results.
DesAutels has argued that Christian Science does not face such a 
dilemma, since the objective of Christian Science practice is not primarily 
to cure disease but rather to attain a state of spiritualized consciousness 
from which healing then naturally flows. Indeed, to the believing Scientist 
this does not seem to be a dilemma at all, since the Scientist believes that 
attainment of this altered state of consciousness results in physical healing, 
indeed, always results in healing if this more spiritualized consciousness is 
really attained. But Christian Science cannot have it both ways: It cannot 
claim to be a religious system and, at the same time, base its appeal on
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claims that it is effective in curing disease.4 This leaves us with the dilemma 
set out above. Thus I would like to explore what Christian Science faces in 
pursuing one alternative or the other—to explore the routes DesAutels 
claims cannot and need not be taken. I see such exploration as the only way 
of preserving the church’s moral integrity in the face of objections that it 
violates the basic canon of informed consent, a canon as essential in reli­
gious practice, I have argued, as in other areas of professional ethics. To 
look at these options is thus to pursue the conversation DesAutels incor­
rectly thought would come to an end with the assertion that Scientists and 
non-Scientists simply have different worldviews. They may in fact have dif­
ferent worldviews, but this is hardly the end of the story.
Two options are open to Christian Science. The first is to prove the 
medical claims. Suppose Christian Science elected to try to prove that its 
healing practices are effective. Doing so would necessarily involve compar­
ative empirical studies of outcomes of Christian Science healing versus 
available alternatives. This is not to try to combine or blend medicine and 
healing, as would indeed be problematic if, as DesAutels claims, different 
worldviews are involved, but to look at the outcomes of each independent 
form of treatment.
Conducting comparative empirical studies would clearly constitute a 
different way of establishing efficacy than the ways now recognized by the 
church, which are limited to direct personal experience of one’s own heal­
ings and first-person accounts by others. Christian Science could not con­
tinue to rely on its practice of giving testimonials, on its weighty record, A 
Century of Christian Science Healing,5 or even on its own so-called empir­
ical study, an ample collection and analysis of anecdotal reports of cases of 
healing between 1969 and 1988,6 since such stories and accounts cannot 
establish base rates of illness and cure or provide any reliable comparative 
data. In particular, they cannot establish the sometimes tacit, sometimes 
explicit assumption that Christian Science healing is effective where con­
ventional medicine is not, especially in the most serious cases, even though 
many Scientists have what they describe as extremely powerful, convincing 
experiences of such healings, sometimes occurring in cases in which there 
has been antecedent diagnosis and failed medical treatment.
What would be required to try to prove Christian Science’s claims are 
rigorously designed studies comparing rates of illness and cure for those us­
ing Christian Science prayer, conventional medical treatment, and no treat­
ment, and, perhaps, nonconventional or countercultural forms of medical 
treatment as well. Such studies can be either general—comparing, for 
example, lost work days, disability, or death rates for matched samples from
each group—or specific, comparing outcomes by identified condition, 
including, say, influenza, diabetes, breast cancer, hepatitis, or myocardial in­
farction. Comparative empirical studies of Christian Science treatment have 
been proposed in the past, including, for example, by Dr. Isabelle V. 
Kendig, then chief clinical psychologist at the National Institute of Mental 
Health, who in 1957 sought to compare the health records of a group of 
one hundred Christian Scientist inductees in the U.S. Navy with matched 
non-Scientist controls. (The study was blocked, according to Robert Peel, 
not by the church, which said it had no objection to the project, but by the 
government, apparendy leery [in Kendig’s words] of anything having to do 
with religion.7) But the church has opposed or failed to support most calls 
for rigorous comparative studies, usually arguing that randomization would 
not be possible, that treatment by prayer and by conventional medical pro­
cedure could not be offered in double-blind fashion, and that it would be 
destructive to the spirituality of believing Scientists to subject them to 
conventional medical diagnosis, even if they were not to be treated.
Nevertheless, one route open to the church is to work with conventional 
medical practitioners in designing studies that as far as possible overcome 
these obstacles and provide objective results about outcomes, both in 
general and on a condition-by-condition basis. This might require some 
ingenuity in study design; for example, comparisons could be based on 
symptom clusters rather than diagnosed conditions; or both Scientist and 
non-Scientist volunteers could be solicited to undergo diagnosis but not 
be informed of the results; or large populations could be followed under 
careful matching for all health-risk factors; and so on.8 Furthermore, it 
would require some sensitivity to conceptual issues, for example, in stipu­
lating what counts as morbidity, health, dysfunction, remission, and cure; 
and so on. Non-Scientists as well as Scientists might have to rethink their 
conceptions of medical benefit, risk, and outcome. Designing such studies 
may be less difficult for minor conditions than for major, life-threatening 
illnesses, or more difficult in conditio s that include psychiatric as well as 
physical illness. Nevertheless, I think it is possible to construct at least some 
informative, suggestive studies, at least if there is adequate cooperation be­
tween Scientists and non-Scientists in their design.
The second option that is open to Christian Science is to augment the 
religious claims and abandon claims to effectiveness. The alternative route 
for Christian Science would be to reinforce its identity as a religion, drop­
ping practices (e.g., charging fees for healing and having Blue Cross pay 
the bill) that suggest it is essentially an alternative medical system. (Much 
of what DesAutels says suggests that it should be understood primarily in
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this way, that is, as a religion rather than as an alternative medical system.) 
Doing so would be no easier than designing adequate controlled trials, 
since dropping these self-presentation features would involve departing 
from much of Christian Science’s history and current practice. Among 
other things, this would mean dropping the practice of having testimoni­
als about healing serve as a major part of Wednesday worship services, dis­
continuing the practice of printing testimonials of healings in church pub­
lications, and, of course, dropping reimbursement by Blue Cross. Worship 
services would focus on the achievement of enlightened consciousness, and 
the publication of testimonials by Scientists would serve to show how they 
came to achieve such consciousness. Prayer practices would not be initi­
ated for the purpose of healing. Furthermore, prayer would not be pri­
marily initiated in conditions of illness but would be engaged in for its own 
intrinsic value, without reference to its side effects in healing. Turning to 
prayer would no longer be the normal, institutionally supported response 
in time of illness; instead, prayer would simply be encouraged all the time 
(as it already is) but not redoubled or specialized for times of illness. Nor 
would the group maintain any further practice (though it is often insisted 
that this is not the case) of prohibiting or discouraging members from 
turning to conventional medicine in time of illness. In these ways, Chris­
tian Science would be transformed into a religious group more like, say, 
Buddhism in character, in which the central objective of practice is the at­
tainment and maintenance of a nonmaterialist, spiritualist worldview. If 
Scientists also wished to believe that this spiritualized consciousness also 
results in physical healing, that would be their business; but the church 
would no longer encourage prayer or the quest for more spiritualized con­
sciousness in order to be healed, either as a primary or a secondary effect.
Neither course of action would seem to preserve much of what we now 
think of as Christian Science; they may seem to be extreme and unrealistic. 
Furthermore, DesAutels has already offered objections to both of them: 
against the first, that the effectiveness of Christian Science healing is not 
open to empirical proof; and against the second, that Christian Science’s 
self-presentation does not delude either current members or prospective 
ones, since its dedication to the achievement of a more spiritualized under­
standing is explicit or presupposed in all its presentations and practices, and 
healing is already understood by all as a by-product or secondary goal. But 
DesAutels’s objections are both open to counterargument. To the first, it 
would be possible, though not perhaps easy, to actually test the efficacy of 
Christian Science healing practices in an unbiased way. To the second, 
Christian Science’s current self-presentation can delude both current
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members and prospective future ones. This is true whether or not their 
“worldviews” are different or similar to those of non-Scientists, that is, 
whether they do or do not have materialist outlooks. Rather, what counts 
here are the outcomes of the practices in question and their effects on peo­
ple who engage in them, including long-term members, new members who 
convert in order to cure illness that medical science has been unable to treat, 
and, where decisions to pursue Christian Science healing rather than med­
ical care have been made on their behalf, children. That leaves Christian Sci­
ence facing the dilemma outlined above—either put up or shut up. Either 
prove that healing is effective (and not just by adding up anecdotal stories) 
or stop claiming that it is. Though these two positions may seem to be ex­
treme ones, they are the only two ways to resolve the moral dilemma Chris­
tian Science now faces.
But this seems to suggest that the two routes, (1) to put up by proving 
that healing is effective or (2) to shut up by dropping claims that it is, are 
equally defensible as courses of action for the church. However, I do not 
think this is the case; in order to understand this, is it necessary to look at 
the relationship between the two.
Consider what might happen if the church pursued the first course of 
action: It would decide to “put up” by providing evidence and so would 
be willing to cooperate in the design and execution of the comparative 
studies described above. These would be three-armed trials of Christian 
Science healing versus conventional medical treatment versus nontreat­
ment, including both general studies of outcomes across populations and 
targeted studies of specific conditions, and might even include additional 
arms for various nonconventional medical therapies. I harbor no illusions 
that it would be easy to construct a fully rigorous study acceptable to both 
Scientists and practitioners of conventional medicine, even with maximal 
good will and genuine commitment to open exploration on both sides, but 
I do think it would be possible for such a study or groups of studies to pro­
duce quite suggestive results.
But now consider what the results might be: There are three principal 
possibilities. First, comparative studies might show that Christian Science 
appears to offer no benefits, either in general or for specific conditions, over 
conventional medical treatment or nontreatment: Christian Scientists have 
more symptoms, more illnesses, more sustained illnesses, and they die 
sooner. Second, such studies might instead show that Christian Science 
produces better results than standard medical treatment, both in general 
or for specific groups of conditions: Christian Scientists have fewer symp­
toms, fewer illnesses, shorter illnesses, and live longer. Third, the results
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might show that Christian Science offers benefit over nontreatment, but 
not over standard medical treatment, or benefit over standard medical 
treatment but not, at least in some conditions, over nontreatment, and so 
on. (At the moment, we have virtually no reliable data about any of these 
claims, except certain comparisons of outcomes of standard medical treat­
ment and nontreatment.9) Nevertheless, regardless of the outcomes of 
these studies, Christian Science would risk little by cooperating in such 
studies, at least insofar as it identifies itself as a religion: Neither “good,” 
“neutral,” nor “bad” results can damage the central religious claim that the 
ultimate objective of religious life is to achieve a more spiritualized con­
sciousness. This is the claim that, in DesAutels’s view, should be taken as 
central, and it is right in concert with the assertion she quotes from Mary 
Baker Eddy that “the mission of Christian Science now, as in the time of 
its earlier demonstration, is not primarily one of physical healing.” Thus 
far, Christian Science has little to lose; it is protected whichever way the 
studies turn out. Furthermore, even if the studies were to show that Sci­
entist prayer has worse outcomes than conventional medicine or nontreat­
ment, this would still not refute the claim that spiritualized consciousness 
always results in healing; it would merely undermine the claim that it is 
prudent to think one can attain such consciousness in an attempt to cure 
disease. Thus it would undercut the practice of seeking aid in prayer dur­
ing times of illness in order to attain cure, though it need not discourage 
or preclude the practice of seeking aid in prayer not only in illness but at 
all times of one’s life. Indeed, if the group is a religious group, this might 
seem to be a gain: Prayer would cease to be valued for extrinsic purposes 
and would be valued wholly for intrinsic ones. In the bargain, of course, 
this change would protect both loyal Christian Scientists and prospective 
converts from practices that would do them no good.
After all, the real test of whether Christian Science sees itself as a reli­
gious group rather than an alternative medical system is whether, as a 
group, it would continue to pursue spiritualized consciousness if it were 
demonstrated that attaining it did not result in healing. Thus cooperating 
in studies of the efficacy of Scientist prayer, as well as working to ensure 
that those studies were designed without bias and would yield intelligible 
results, would enhance Christian Science’s self-understanding as well as re­
inforce its spiritual claims.
But suppose Christian Science, when faced with the dilemma outlined 
above, were instead to begin by pursuing alternative 2, to “shut up” by em­
phasizing only the religious claims and rejecting any attempt to prove the 
efficacy of Christian Science healing. It would thus retreat from all self-
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presentation practices that might suggest that healing is effective, like the 
use of testimonials, the avoidance of conventional medicine, and the use of 
Blue Cross to pay bills for prayer. It would of course undergo substantial 
changes, as remarked above, in moving away from much of its traditional 
and current practice, as reference to health benefits dropped out of the pic­
ture. But this would be to reinforce the centrality of prayer designed to 
achieve a more spiritualized consciousness. Presumably, then, Christian 
Scientists, no longer pursuing prayer in order to achieve health, would 
come to use prayer for enhanced spiritual life but would probably rely on 
conventional medicine in times of illness, or perhaps turn to unconven­
tional therapies or forgo any sort of treatment altogether.
As before, several different things could happen: First, Christian Scien­
tists’ health prospects could be improved; second, Christian Scientists’ 
health prospects could remain about the same; or third, Christian Scientists’ 
prospects could grow worse, depending, of course, on whether Christian 
Science prayer has actually turned out to be effective, neutral, or damaging 
in comparison to conventional or nonconvention al medical treatment or 
nontreatment for various kinds of illness. But Christian Scientists would have 
no way of knowing which was the case. It could be that the church, in choos­
ing to “shut up,” that is, to cease making claims about the efficacy of heal­
ing, had elected a course of action that would make its members and 
prospective converts worse off, or it could be that they were better off (or 
worse off for some disease conditions but better off for others), but in the 
absence of the comparative studies considered above, neither the church, its 
members, nor anybody else would have any reliable way of knowing this. 
(This, of course, is the current state of affairs.) But insofar as the moral in­
junction the church must respond to in the first place is the accusation that 
it violates canons of informed consent by not making or attempting to make 
available to its members and prospective members the kind of information 
that will allow them to make prudent choices about their own lives, in­
cluding whether or not to turn to Christian Science prayer in time of illness, 
this course of action still runs afoul of this injunction.
Thus it is not just an open option whether the church should pursue 
alternative 1 or alternative 2, whether it should “put up” or “shut up.” 
Although the church may eventually be morally obliged to shut up if it 
cannot put up, it ought not merely shut up without some sincere attempt 
to provide concrete evidence concerning the efficacy of its practices, that 
is, to determine whether the healing practices it now employs may not be 
efficacious in some or all conditions. It already tries to do this (that is what 
its testimonies of healings and its own “empirical study” are meant to do,
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provide evidence that prayer really works), but it does not try to do so in 
rigorously scientific ways. Yet not to try to establish the efficacy of prayer 
(or establish that it is not effective after all) is to shortchange not only be­
lieving members and prospective converts, but all other persons who now 
rely on conventional or unconventional medicine or who avoid treatment 
altogether.
There is another way to put this. If Christian Science knows a secret— 
or rather, as it believes, a “demonstrable science”—about what is conven­
tionally labeled illness and disease, this is knowledge of paramount impor­
tance for everyone, not just Christian Scientists. After all, everyone is 
subject to illness and disease, and these conditions can cause immense suf­
fering and loss in the lives of any person. Given the importance of any form 
of real knowledge about illness and disease, regardless of its origin, a group 
that had access to that knowledge would be morally obliged to explore 
whether its knowledge is in fact a reliable, trustworthy, genuine form of 
knowledge, indeed, a demonstrable “science,” as it claims. To keep it as a 
secret for the religiously initiated would seem perverse, even if it might 
eventually turn out that the knowledge can be effectively used only by 
those who accept the background religious view. Of course, at the mo­
ment, neither Christian Scientists nor outside detractors can know whether 
its claims are true. To retreat before public criticism of its practices into a 
more insular religiosity would be the less morally defensible course, one 
that would make itself still more vulnerable to the initial moral objection 
brought against it; to try to explore the truths it believes would be the more 
defensible and principled one. After all, Christian Science, as I argued ear­
lier, has little to lose (except its current indefensible ambivalence) by co­
operating with medical science in exploring its claims. Even if its claims are 
not supported, Christian Science can still survive as a religious group with 
a commitment to prayer and the attainment of a nonmaterialist worldview, 
but it has a great deal to lose by not doing so.
To be sure, a comprehensive, well-designed set of studies could also 
have a great deal to say about the nature of self-limiting conditions, iatro­
genic disease, and the placebo effect, and on these grounds alone would be 
of value. But it would also have a great deal to say about (religious) claims, 
which conventional medical science now simply ignores. Thus, in reply to 
DesAutels’s interesting and sensitive remarks, I would encourage her not 
to treat the alleged difference in worldviews between Scientists and non­
Scientists as a conversation stopper but to recognize that this is the begin­
ning of a conversation that would do well for both Scientists and non­
Scientists to continue.
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C o n c l u s i o n :  A g r e e i n g  t o  D i s a g r e e ?
Margaret P. Battin, Peggy DesAutels, Larry May
In this volume, three philosophers concerned with the ethical issues that 
various forms of organized religion can raise have explored dilemmas posed 
by the beliefs and practices of Christian Science. One of us, Peggy DesAu­
tels, was raised in the Christian Science tradition; the other two of us, 
Peggy Battin and Larry May, are not members of this tradition and hence 
view it from the outside, as indeed most critics do. But this is not a batde 
between adherents and critics; on the contrary, all three of us are trying to 
reach a conscientious, responsible, joint understanding of the difficult is­
sues Christian Science raises and to recommend workable, sensitive, 
broadly acceptable social policies.
But it doesn’t seem to be working. There are deep differences here, dif­
ferences that appear to remain even after our extended discussions. Batdn 
still thinks that Christian Science ought to provide base-rate data and other 
kinds of confirmatory evidence for the healings it claims to have accom­
plished; only with such evidence, she insists, can people (Scientists and 
non-Scientists alike) make informed choices about how to protect their 
health. The same sort of information, Battin thinks, is necessary for mak­
ing informed choices about the health care of children. DesAutels rejects 
these demands for empirical study, insisting both that such information is 
irrelevant to the practice of Christian Science and that attempts to gather 
such information would impose the medical model of health and disease 
on Christian Scientists. Meanwhile, May still thinks a compromise is pos­
sible in the matter of medical treatment for children, if both Christian Sci­
entists and medical professionals are socialized to respect each other’s con­
victions; this would in general permit parents to seek Christian Science 
healing for their children most of the time but mandate medical treatment 
for problems that are severe or life threatening. Again, DesAutels rejects
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this. Furthermore, Battin and May do not identify the same issues in Chris­
tian Science as the centrally problematic ones, though both agree there are 
problems that are not resolved by DesAutels’s answers, sensitive and un­
derstanding though they may be. It looks as though we three have hit bot­
tom, so to speak, in plumbing the depths of our disagreement. The civi­
lized thing to do, it may now seem, is to “agree to disagree” : To recognize 
that these differences are irreconcilable and to find some more or less 
makeshift way of accommodating public policy and practice to this huge 
gulf.
But do we really disagree? After all, we hold many points in common— 
matters of basic philosophical, political, and public policy commitment. 
How we can disagree about anything substantial if we agree about all these 
things? The following list displays just some of the things we do agree 
about:
• that people’s religious beliefs should be respected
• that prayer may be meaningful and important to those who engage 
in it
• that state intrusion into religion should be minimized
• that ill health (whatever that is) is undesirable
• that people have the right to make their own health care decisions
• that Christian Science is a long-established, cherished tradition
• that Christian Science parents care deeply about their children
• that children ought not be abused, injured, or caused to suffer or 
die
• that children ought not be allowed to die when they can be saved
• that legal batdes over how Christian Scientist parents may treat 
their children are undesirable
• that the state acts appropriately in protecting vulnerable parties 
from abuse
• that some medical treatment is followed by “cure”
• that some Christian Science treatment is followed by “cure”
• that some medical treatment fails to produce “cure”
• that some Christian Science treatment fails to produce “cure”
If there is disagreement, DesAutels claims, it is at a deeper level, not just 
about facts and values at any superficial level but about basic issues in meta­
physics. Christian Science sees a person as an expression of divine Mind, 
not matter, and the human body as shaped by the comprehension of each 
individual; non-Scientists see the human body as flesh and blood, a mate­
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rial substance animated by a nervous system and guided by intentions—an 
ordered, functioning organic system. For Christian Scientists, “disease” is 
misunderstanding; for non-Scientists, disease is physical disorder in an or­
ganic physical system. This is the conflict between religious idealism and 
secular materialism, twain that cannot meet.
But can we really disagree about the metaphysics of the human body? 
To be sure, the entire history of philosophy might seem to provide ample 
fuel for such disagreement: Plato, Berkeley, Kant, and Hegel are idealists 
or partly so, though in various ways; Epicurus and Lucretius, Hobbes, 
Marx, and Darwin are materialists, though of different sorts too, and they 
have radically different theoretical views about the human body. But does 
the practical disagreement that erupts for us in friction over foregoing con­
ventional health care in favor of Christian Science healing, and especially 
over denying conventional health care to children, resemble that of the 
philosophers?
Certainly, the disagreement is at least in part the product of what each 
of us, as believers or nonbelievers, as patients, as parents, sees as “out 
there,” in the world, or “in here,” in us and of us. But do we really “see” 
and experience something different? Three philosophers are writing this 
book; two of them stretch out their hands and see skin, flesh, the structure 
of bone; the third does the same but attempts to see the idea of God that 
lies behind this apparent physical structure. Democritus would have 
claimed to see his outstretched hand as a collection of atoms; Plato would 
have seen his as an exemplar of an ideal Form; many others thinkers would 
claim to see theirs in a variety of ways, though G. E. Moore stretched out 
his own hand hoping to end what he viewed as nonsense: “Is this a hand I 
see before me?” he asked, insisting that the answer could not be anything 
but yes.
It is right here that the most basic challenges and disagreements may 
seem to arise. Is the difference in what the three of us see as we discuss 
Christian Science, stretching out our hands before us, an elective differ­
ence, if it is a difference at all? Do “idealist” and “materialist” accounts 
provide accurate descriptions of what we each see and experience? Can 
one “choose” to see one’s own hand in these different ways? Could one 
change one’s way of seeing? (If not, presumably it would be impossible 
to “convert” to Christian Science.) Is “practical idealism” really possible 
at all? Or do we all actually see our hands as physical structures of skin, 
flesh, bone, with some of us—those with certain religious commit­
ments—then “reinterpreting” this phenomenon as a manifestation of di­
vine Mind, just as some philosophers reinterpret it as assemblages of
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atoms or instantiations of the Forms? Or perhaps is it the other way 
around; could we all be seeing our hands as projections of consciousness 
but reified by some of us as objects of flesh and bone? O f course there 
can be disagreements among people over all sorts of matters, including 
facts, policies, customs, beliefs, the requirements of morality, and many 
other things; but can there be genuine disagreements in practice, in 
everyday life, over metaphysics? Do we actually see and experience our 
own hands, our own bodies, in different ways, or do we merely live with 
different official commitments about how we will interpret them? Yet it 
is these very bodies, of which our hands are part, that are at issue in de­
cision making about conventional medical treatment versus Christian Sci­
ence healing.
If there are basic metaphysical disagreements, agreement may elude us. 
If there are not, we cannot “agree to disagree”; agreement itself is too near 
to let it drop. What might the agreement be, in practice, if we could reach 
it? Larry May suggests a compromise solution in which parents are free to 
employ Christian Science healing for their children’s minor ailments but 
are expected to turn to conventional medicine for severe, life-threatening 
ailments, like Robyn Twitchell’s intestinal blockage. Battin would accept 
this arrangement, provided that adequate base-rate and other data were 
available to show that conventional medicine outperformed Christian Sci­
ence in severe, life-threatening ailments but not in minor ones, largely self- 
limiting ones, both for adults and children. Given such data, adults would 
be free as a matter of basic religious liberty to make whatever practical 
choices they wanted for themselves, even if it clearly meant a probable ear­
lier death, but ought not make choices for their children that would likely 
mean death when recovery was otherwise possible. Could the Christian 
Scientist, DesAutels, agree? This might seem easy, since Christian Science 
can still flourish in the vast majority of cases in which the condition is not 
severe, iatrogenesis is a risk, outcomes are not known, or the condition is 
self-limiting; conventional medicine could be encouraged just in that mi­
nority of cases reliably known to be truly serious. But the Christian Scien­
tist committed to an idealist conception of reality cannot agree without 
giving away the store; to agree to calling in conventional medicine for the 
most severe cases would be either to relinquish the claim that persons are 
“really” spiritual, idealist beings, not material ones, or to acknowledge that 
sometimes healing doesn’t occur even in the best of attempts to see per­
sons, including oneself, as ideal, spiritual beings. Of course, Christian Sci­
ence already acknowledges that people are sometimes unable to fully un­
derstand the true nature of reality, and that hence prayer fails to achieve
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healing in some cases; but if it grants this, then the wisdom of “praying for 
a cure” is open to challenge in every case.
To see the issue more clearly of whether we can “agree to disagree,” we 
can also explore whether we can or cannot agree in a specific case, for ex­
ample, the case of little Robyn Twitchell. Clearly, we agree about a great 
deal. We all agree that Robyn’s parents desperately wanted what was best 
for him. We all agree that Robyn’s symptoms were, to the nonprofessional 
(though perhaps not to the professional), difficult to interpret: symptoms 
of serious distress intermittent with symptoms of apparent cure, con­
founded by the fact that his older brother had had similar symptoms the 
previous week and had recovered without incident. We all agree that 
Robyn experienced at least some pain, that he vomited, and that he died. 
Yet we disagree about what Robyn’s parents should have done in re­
sponding to this situation. Battin thinks that the Twitchells should have 
been informed, when they first sought Christian Science healing, of the ap­
proximate likelihood that this treatment would be effective, given the 
symptoms, compared to conventional treatment, just as they would or 
should have been informed of the likely benefits and risks of conventional 
treatment: They should have been told that with surgery for the blockage 
there was a good chance that Robyn could have been saved and that with­
out the surgery—with or without Christian Science prayer—he would al­
most certainly die. May thinks that the parents and the Christian Science 
practitioner who was called should have been socialized to recognize that 
the case was a serious one, appropriate for conventional medicine, and that 
Robyn should have been taken to the hospital. DesAutels thinks Robyn’s 
parents did the loving, religiously sincere, appropriate thing for their child. 
Are we disagreeing about the facts of the case here, or are we really dis­
agreeing about its metaphysics? Are we all just talking about differing in­
terpretations of the evidence about what was wrong with Robyn, or are we 
talking about different conceptions of what Robyn’s symptoms repre­
sented and indeed, about what Robyn, as a human person and human 
body, was in himself? If it is the former—different interpretations of evi­
dence—we can agree to agree and keep working until we have all the facts 
and values sorted out; if is the latter—different underlying metaphysics— 
we can only disagree and perhaps not even agree on whether to do so or 
not. It may not even be easy to say what differences these alleged meta­
physical differences would make, if any at all. There is no easy way to re­
solve these issues; it is what makes them so interesting, and it is why ethi­
cal issues in the practice of organized religion are so compelling, an area of 
philosophical reflection we all believe will grow.
Personal Note from Peggy Battin
In March 1998, distinguished clarinetist Christie Lundquist died. This is 
not a fictional story and this is not a made-up name; Christie Lundquist, 
first clarinetist of the Utah Symphony, was a clarinetist of national reputa­
tion, “legendary” in the words of one of her colleagues. I spoke with 
Christie only twice about her practice of Christian Science, but I had been 
watching for years from my balcony seat at the symphony. Over the years, 
she had grown thinner and a little gaunt, and the color of her skin had 
shifted from normal Caucasian flesh tones to a yellower, greener cast. Her 
colleagues in the symphony said that she missed many rehearsals, that she 
was often ill. We surmised that it was liver disease, ineluctably advancing.
A medically trained friend was with me at the symphony one evening 
and found her symptoms so pronounced that they could be diagnosed 
from the balcony. “She won’t live six months,” said the friend, but in fact 
Christie lived another three years; she was fifty-one when she died. 
Whether she would have lived longer (or not) with conventional treatment 
I do not know. A friend said that she had contracted hepatitis in Mexico 
twenty years earlier and that the national symphony with which she was 
playing had made her see a doctor; but of course she did not see a doctor 
and would not consider it. Her colleagues in the symphony were furious; 
she was a brilliant player as well as a remarkable athlete and a wonderfully 
witty human being. They loved her and they respected her, even though 
she seemed to have no conception of her disease or its potential conse­
quences. Indeed, they said, among the woodwinds, she was always grab­
bing people’s mouthpieces and trying them out.
Watching the progression of her disease from the balcony, performance 
after performance over a long period of years, cost an immense effort of will 
to try to summon respect—genuine respect, not superficial tolerance—for 
her beliefs and for her way of living. I too was angry: angry that her beliefs 
should lead her to die, destroying a remarkable talent, robbing the symphony 
of a brilliant player, and robbing herself of life. More than once, I wanted to 
rush down to the stage from the balcony and shake her, to say, “Christie, 
quick, go to a doctor before it’s too late. Don’t just let yourself die.”
But when I talked with her, just once, and once again—seeing at close 
range die real deterioration of her skin, its many small lesions, the yellowed 
filaments in her eyes—she spoke so movingly of the importance of her be­
liefs that I could not bring myself to say words like “liver failure” or “see a 
doctor,” which seemed not only rude and invasive but somehow irrelevant. 
She lived in a different world, I think, one in which these expressions would
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have made little sense. She told me at length how much her beliefs in Chris­
tian Science had contributed to her playing of the clarinet, and she seemed 
not at all afraid of whatever future she was facing. When she talked, I felt 
an odd sense of awe.
Those who spoke to Christie in the Christian Science nursing home in 
which she spent her final days said she was upbeat, very upbeat. She cheered 
them up when they called, they said, not the other way around, even 
though she knew she was dying.
Did Christie and I ever talk, really talk? Could she have conveyed to me 
at any real level what she believed or why she believed it? After ail, I 
couldn’t seem to talk to her about my own comparatively “materialist” 
conception of the universe or of the human body and its functions, and I 
couldn’t seem to say the things I believed about her. I wanted to say, I can 
see that you are very ill; you should seek real medical help soon, before it is 
too late; it is stupid to waste your life this way. But 1 just couldn’t do it. I 
do not know whether we could have ever really talked in any way that we 
both could have understood, in any way that would have resolved dis­
agreement; but I know that it is too late now. I’m left with the anger—and 
the sense of awe. If there is a paradox and a deep gulf of understanding in 
approaches between those who believe in Christian Science and those who 
do not, this is it—that feeling of both intimacy and unbridgeable distance 
in this conversation between a nonbeliever who would go on living and a 
believer about to die.
Personal Note from Larry May
A doctor I know, perhaps the most open-minded and sensitive doctor I 
have ever known, was one of only two physicians on our hospital ethics 
committee to side with me in thinking that Christian Science children 
should not be forced into medical treatment. He and I often talked about 
how important it was to avoid paternalism in these matters. But one day 
things changed for him. Here is the story he told at one of our monthly 
ethics committee meetings. He had come to know a Christian Science child 
with cystic fibrosis who was referred to him by a doctor who had treated 
her since infancy. He eventually developed a “working relationship” with 
the family, agreeing never to discuss the child’s medical condition with her 
and to do minor examination of her in her home every week. At least as he 
told the story, and I have no reason to disbelieve him, there was mutual re­
spect between himself and the parents. When the girl improved he didn’t 
see her for a few months, by mutual consent.
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One day, the parents summoned him because the girl was not gaining 
weight and was breathing hard. At her bedside he detected a distinct blue­
ness to her skin—she desperately needed more oxygen. He informed the 
family that she was seriously ill, slowly suffocating to death. He said he 
couldn’t help her anymore in the restricted way they had been proceeding. 
He recommended immediate hospitalization. The parents refused.
He contacted our ethics committee and the hospital lawyer. He told us 
that he was beginning the process necessary to get a court order to force 
her parents to bring her into the hospital. He was clearly emotionally 
drained by the last few days, having had little sleep and worrying con­
stantly. In our meeting, I argued with him (I was the only one), but my 
heart wasn’t in it. For whatever reason, the doctor didn’t pursue the court 
order, and the girl died several days later. Even though he did what I 
thought, at the time, was best, I’m still haunted by this story, as is he. The 
tragedy of the situation overwhelms me.
Personal Note from Peggy DesAutels
I could respond to the previous personal notes by describing cases either 
of Christian Scientists recovering from medically incurable conditions or of 
non-Christian Scientists suffering and dying while under medical care. I 
will do neither. I will simply add that I rejoice when others experience good 
in their lives and that I too am saddened when others suffer and die. Un­
fortunately, neither medicine nor Christian Science has found a way to 
eliminate suffering and death from human experience. All that any of us 
can do is attempt to find insight, health, and healing by turning to the 
sources we most trust.
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